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PRONUNCIATION OF POLISH NAMES* 
j., is pronounced like y 
1, like ee 
w, like English v 
u, like oo 
l \ 
" 
.. . r, cz, like the English ch, as in child 
sz, like sh, as in shall 
rz, like the French·j, as in jardin 
szcz, like shch 
ch·, like k 
g, always pronounced hard, as in gin get 
' 'k 
*Sources Miecislaus Haiman, Poland and the American 
Revolutionary War (Chicago: Polish Roman Catholic Union 
of America, 1932), p. X. 
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ABSTRACT .. 
~ One of the problems coni-ronting Prance I s anc1en regime 
and contributing to its fall wa#i a disastrous foreign policy. " 
In the 1750 1 s and 1760 1 s Louis xv•s government encountered 
defeat on several fronts. 
The most significant loss for the reg1me·was t~e Seven 
·'· Years• War. The Treaty of Paris of 1763, which ended the 
. war, oos.t France- Canada, her l;ndian Empire and Louisiana, 
and much prestige. Despite the territorial losses dictated I 
by the treaty, the regime was in such bad straits that it 
welcomed the peace. This favorable reaction to an unsatis-
factory peace gives a clue to the general condition of France's 
--foreign relations. Wh11e the Seven Years• War was being lost, 
French diplomatic .blundering in Eastern Eu.rope paved the way 
for the eventual parti.tion of Franoe•·s old ally, the Republic 
. ·:~,, 
, 
of-Poland. French policy in Poland was a disaster. 
The main cause of France's diplomatic defeat was that 
the kingdom operated two diplomacies in Poland. The Foreign 
Ministry advanced its own Polish policy while Louis XV engaged 
1n a secret diplomacy usually opposed to his ministry's schemes. 
No French foreign minister seems to have learned the full e:x:-
, . 
tent of Louis XV' s olandest.ine dealings w1 th the result that 
1 
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France's ·two policies often negated each other. In the .-
17509s French secret and official polioy makers failed to 
~ recognize that- th-e-11: involvement in internal Polish politics 
. 
weakened the republic. France's involvement in the Seven 
' Years' War took events in Pola.nd·out of French hands and 
--op-en-ed-- the way for increased Russian influence in Poland. 
The kingdom's alliance with Russia meant that France could 
only protest that Eastern power's encroachments in Poland a:t 
the risk of losing an ally. Because the war was going poorly 
for France, the Foreign Ministry remained silent as Russia 
~ 
moved troops through Poland to engage Frederick II. ,The 
· -King's Secret worked to combat rising Russian influence in 
Poland but to no avail. In 1764, the Russian-supported can-
didate was elected king of Poland. This event cleared.the 
w.~y for a Russian led partition of Poland in 1774. 
This thesis examines French policy in Poland. Such an 
examination is pertinent to the study of the eighteenth cen-
tury because the blunde+s in Poland were_ symptomatic of the 
I ancien regime's conduct of its foreign relations. The defeat 
in Polands,added to the losses of the Seven Years• War, com-
11::, 
bined to surround the regime with an aura of defeat. This 
=--~-------- .. --·~·--=-=-=---~-=:=----=··:-------~-----~ai-r of --defeat discr-edi-ted the governmet!~ at home. It'----ma~-~---~-----~~-~~-- ~- - - - ------ -------~-· - - ·------ --·-- ·c.---.--, ______ .---- --·--~~----------------·--·--- --.---~ - -
Frenchmen hacl little faith 11-1__._th_(!__i~ __ government b$ 178-9, -··--- ·····- - - -···-'.---··---·---- ---~ ...:.:..,·.-:.:._ ---.·--- . . . -·· ·~- ·- .. ~-···----··----·~-------------~-· ······-·---·· -----c _____ _. __ --- ···---~ 
:"'.' • L 
foreign relations defeats such as Poland contributed to this-
sentiment. 
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In his no~-standard histery of the French Revolution, 
1. . 
Leo Gershoy cataloged the problems faced by Louis XVI upon 
ascending the throne of France in 1774. Gershey.noted that 
the inability of the king and the ahcien regime to cope with 
these problems led to the revolution of 1789~ Prominent 
among the problems which the new King Louis XVI inherited 
from his predecessor Louis XV wa.s"a government discredited 
by its ruinous foreign polioy.ttl 
"Ruinous" is indeed the correct adjective to describe 
French foreign policy under Louis XV. Louis XIV had made 
the nation the strongest power in Europe and, at his death 
in 1715,· French might was felt from Gibraltar to the Levant. 
By the time Louis-xv joined his royal predecessor at 
Saint Denis in 1774, · France was more a spectator on the 
European sc.ene than a major participant. 2 The general de-
.. , . 
. ... 
-----------~-- · · - olirie- of French power and the concomitant rise of Great Brit-
~.. I 
. ain prompted one historian to title his study of the period 
----
·~==~-... ---c-~--,-··--c-::---·-- _ . ...,. .. _ ,--·- ._----
------------c.--lnte-o----el-ershor,--The-Fr-encp-neVOlu~tion-an.a·~-Nap-o1eon. (NetAJ"-York: 
Appleton-Century-Crofts 9 1964) ~ Po Jo 
7 2H. Carr~ 9 Le regne de Louis XV- 1 15-1 4, Vol. VIII, Part 2 of Ernest Lavisse (Edo 9 L'histoire de France (Par1s·1 Librairie Hachette, 1909), p.411. 
l 
.~- : . 
i 
., 
~ 
i 
i 
t 
1 
I 
-- l j 
- j 
'.j 
t 
~: 
i' 
~ . 
:i 
~: 
...... d 
5 
.. 
. ,: 
_ I ,I 
--',t '. 
- :J J : 
_J J 
,_i • ·{ 
r··"· ... 
-~--.~ 
4 
~ ~ "l 1715-1763 La preponderance an~laise.J 
Perhaps the most stunning defeat in France's foreign 
relations during the reign of Louis XV 1f.J'as the Seven Ye.ar's 1 
War. The Treaty o~ Paris of 1763 left France discredited 
abroad. 4 At home, an historian of this war has noted: 
The long struggle percept! vely wee~ke:p.ed the 
ties which had bound the people of France to 
the dynasty for a thousand years, and in its 
course it took the countr~ far down the road 
to the cataclysm of 1789.' _ 
During the years in which France suffered military 
disasters at Quebec, Rossbach ~nd Plassey, the nation also 
sustained a major diplomatic defeat in Poland. This defeat 
meant a loss of France's traditions .. l irifluence in ·Poland and, 
·""'a ultimately, the first partition of that·;.~··s-tate. The events 
leading up ~o France's defeat in Poland began before the 
seven Years' War, continued throughout the war years and 
culminated with the election of the Russoph1le Stanislas 
Poniatowski as king of Poland in 1764. This election was 
followed by the f~rst partition of Poland in 1772. Coming 
on the heals of the military disasters of the Seven Years 1 
t . 
War, France's dipliomatic colla ..pse in Poland must have con-
-
\. 
Jp1erre Muret 9 La 12r~p9nd~~a.nce anglaise, 1 ?15=1763 9 4th. ed. Volo i(I of Louis He .. lphen and Philippe Sstgne .. c (edso), Peuples et civilisations (Paris: fresses universitaires de France SJ 19491=0 · · ·····~·· · 
4 . 
. ··-Alfred C~obnan, A History of Modern France, Vol. Il· The Old Regime B~nd the RevoJ_u tion, 1715-1789 ·(London: Cape, 1962), p. 930 On the Peace of Paris see Zenab Esmat Rashed, The Peace 
of Paris of 176.J (Liverpool: University of Liverpool Press, 1952). 
'
5tee Kennett, The .French Armies in the Seven Ye~rs • war (DU.rham: Duke University·'Press, 1967), p. ix. 
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tributed to the aura of defeat which surrounded French for-
eign relations in the last years of Lou~s XV's reign. 
~ This thesis will examine France's defeat in Poland. The 
French reversals in Poland have been oversha4owed by the Seven 
Years' War. There 1s room in the history of the ancien_ r~gime 
for the study of both ·t·hese events. Just as the Seven Years' 
War demonstrated the inability of Louis XV's regime to wage ~ 
war successfully, the events in Poland showed the government's) 
\ 
failure in diplomacy. Louis XV's military and diplomatic de-
fe~ts discredited his regime and this proved to be a cause of 
the cataclysmic events of 1789. 
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CHAPTER I 
THE KING, HIS GOVERNMENT AND ITS DIPLOMACY 
The -logical beginning fo~ the study proposed here is .the 
government of Louis XV, the agency which directed and coordi-
nated French diplomatic efforts. At foreign courts, .... the S. 
diplomacy of France clearly reflected the nation!s _political 
system. Frenc·h policy failure in Poland may be viev1ed not 
only fas a case study in diplomatic history but also_. as an in-
dication of the sho~tcomings of the royal government. 
The governmental structure of France's ancien r~gime 
-demanded much of its abs-olute monarch. The largest state in 
' 
Western Europe could only be governed absolutely by a strong 
~d vigorous r71er" in the mold of Louis XIV or by a capable 
first minister such as-Richelieu or Fleury. 
:) 
.. ,,.,..· 
The early years of L0uis XV's reign were dominated by the 
i... 
king Is able first minister, Cardinal Fleury •. Upon Fleury•s 
death, Louis X:.V resolved to rule withou't a first minister. The _,L 
k·ing attempted ~o coord.inate his own policies_ and--each-m-i-n-1-ster 
.. ···--····•·><~••········--··•"...-,~-~-··-··~-<'<~-·-·"~--··--····"'-- -~- . ..,, ................. . 
..::. __ ., .• : ------·----· .. , ---.-~.-,·~··-·' ,-•-·• ••••. c,,,, 
was instructed to report directl-y---t~ the monar·ch,-the govern- -·~--
, 
·mental procedure of Louis XIV. Unforeu:nal;el"y="-=-Lours=:x:.v-,s···p-er·- --
sonal qualities were not those of a strong ruler. 
In a recent f tudy ___ of Louis XV, G. P. Gooch said of the 
monarch: "His lamentable reputation in history-derives less 
6 
,;,; - . 
. ' 
_, .. '~·--------- --·~----------~---------· -----·-·----- ····--··------- ,,;·- .. ' .. -:·· ::,·.,.:;.- ..... 
,I 
I 
\ 
) 
1 
from what he did than from what he never tried to do. For 
him all evils were incurable. nl Lou-is Y:v was an absolute 
' 
ruler who lacked the ability to assert his will. He was un-
- - ( able to make decisions so he avoided ·them. Even when a policy 
decision had been made, the king was halting in his support. of.~ 
a given course of action. Louis was far from stupid, however. 
~ 
In the area of foreign policy, the monarch showed himself; on 
occasi6~, to be extremely perceptive. Yet it was quite char-
acteristic of the king. that he never forced his will on his 
ministers. 2 Louis' personal weaknesses, his indecision and 
his inability to assert his royal will, seriously impaired 
the efficiency of his government in several ways. 
First, with no strong king or first. minister to ooord1-
nate their efforts, ef!oh minister went his ewn way, advo-
cating the interests of his own department with no real con-
cept or the overall nati.onal welfare.J Secondly, the desul-
tory performance of the royal government was underscored by 
.r 
the fact that no gr·eat ministers came to the fore to revamp 
~he administration. In the midst of the nation's greatest 
intellectual ferment, the government enlisted the support of 
rew men of above average ability. The undistinguished men 
------.-- . .,~----------------------·---- --· . -- --
- . --- ·------.. --.-------···· -----·- -~--,··---- - -----------"·--------~---------·----·--···----------------·---,----- ·--- ·--
. . . . 
---------------------
, -
1Ge Po Gooch, Louis XV: The Monarchy in Decline (New 
York:· Longmans, · Green & . Co. V'·-·-· 1956_). , __ . p ··---77 .. !_.--------------·----·------C----·-·-······--···---··---··---- ·- -,----,----;1·..:,__·.. -,~--~4 a-------~~~~~~~~~~~~··-· . 
•A 
•• 
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2 . 
Pierre Gaxotte, Louis the Fifteenth and his Times, 
translated by J. Lewis May (London: J. Cape, 1937) pp. 166-167 • 
. ___ ., 
3
.AJ..fred Cobban, A Histor;y: of Modern France, Vol.Is The Old Regime and the Revolution, 1715-1789 (London: Cape, 1962) pp. 54-55. -
· . / 
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. I 
in petty court intrigues. As:' a. result, ministers rose and 
~~}1 
fell from power freq.uently, leaving the government .:'11th 11 ttle 
oont1n~ity of personnel or policy. 4 
Finally, Louis XV' s administration was charact~rized by·· · · ~. -· .. 
a division of authority. Persons who held no governmental of-
fice frequently wielded power.5 Jeanne le Normant, Marquise 
11 
I de Pompadour most often is c~.~ed as an import~nt non-official 
member of the government but the role of this ro~al favorite 
seems to have been confined to influencing the-king in the 
matter of appointments and disgraces.6 In addition to the 
king's mistress, there existed a whole plethora_o-r men pos-
l 
,. · sessing governmental authority without official responsibility 
for their actions. The influence of these men spread through-
out the administration. For example, the Minister of War in 
1?57, the Marquis de Paulmy, was a virtual non-entity end im-
portant ·military decisions were\made without his knowledge. \ 
Military policy was controlled by P\aris -··ooverney, a .. financier 
who provisioned the French armies, and by two court favorites, 
--------------·-·----=--... -=-----,----------,-----
. - ---------~-- ---- - --- 4Lee Kennett, The French Armies 1hthe Seven Year!;! 0 War (Durhe ..mg Du .. ke University Press~ 19b7), pp-:~5::bo == During the 
----------- -·--~------ -------------··f-ourteen yeBtr period this---study· deals with~ there were five · foreign. ministersg Fran9ois=Dom'inique BarberieS) Marquis de Saint-=Contest from September, 1751 to July 1754; .Axltoine-Louis 
___ Rouil_le.· _to _ Jun.e._,_ _____ l_f-.5.-'l-9---Abbe de---Be-rn-i.s..--t-0--Dece,mber 9 17 58 9 Due de Choiseul to October~ 1-761 and the Due de Pras11-n· to April, 1766. Other ministries changed hands with similar frequency. 
5 -Ibid •. , pp. 7-9. 
6Pierre de Nolhac, Louis XV Elt Mme. de Pompadour d' a3r'es des documents inedites (Paris: N~lson, 1921), pp. 350-J 1. 
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. 
~ the Marshals Belle-Isle. a.nd d • Es trees. The of:fice of the "Con-
troller-General of Finances was held by Peirenc de Moras in 
1757·.,but the ministry's decisions were made by another finan-
\, 
cier, Paris de Montmart~l, the brother of Paris Duverney.? 
The ministers resented the influence of these men with 
the result that there was constant bickering ov.er authority 
in the _gover~ent •. Louis XV' s administration was, then, one 
of personalities rather than 
~ .,} In no other suhere A, 
can the problems of such an adminis ration be seen better than~ 
in its foreign policy. 
Tne official foreign policy of the kingdom until 1756 
was dominated by the traditional rivalry with the Austrian 
Hapsburgs and the equally historic Anglo-French antipathy. 
Austria had been joined. to Britain and the Uni·ted Provinces, 
for many years, in an alliance against the French foe. The 
ranks of rAustria's allies had recently been joined by Russia • 
To counter this alliance system, France had constructed a 
chain of allies in Eastern· Europe ~nd Germany. The classic 
. 1 J. 
French alliance system b.ound the kingdom to Sweden, Pol·and 
and Turkey as well as to various German states. With this 
·····--~---- -· tained Russia, thr.eatened Hanover. 
,",.J ... j 
..... deviations from the official foreign policy. In 1756, one 
7Kerinett, The French Armies, pp. 7-9. 
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of the eighteenth century·• s most important diplomatic events 
was initiated without the knowledge of Foreign Minister An-
. I 
' toine-Louis Rouille. The negotiations leading- to the Bipl-e-----------------~---------·-------- 11 
matic Revolution had been opened by the Austrian Foreign 
Minister, Count Kaunitz,as the British alliance with his 
___________ _euo.press began t(? Grumble-. -Kaunitz u-:td not--oegin negotiations 
,. through official channels but ingratiate.d himself with Mme.Pom-
padour who served as his channel to Louis xv. The king then 
designated a former ambassador and favorite of Mme. Pompadour, 
/ the Abbe Bernis, as his representative at the talks with the 
Austrian ambassador. Not until these negotiations were under-· 
-, 
/ way did the king inform Rouille and several other ministers 
of the existence of the discussions. D'Argenson, the Minister 
' 
·or War, became aware of the king's dealings with Austria only ( . . 
'when the resulting treaty was announced to the public. 8 
Perhaps the most important example of the governmental 
confusion and lack of direction which characterized the ad-
ministration of Louis XV was the existence of the King's Se-
cret. The King's Secret was a clandestine diplomacy relating I 
mainly to Poland. Louis X!l- carried.on_ his secret diplomacy 
for almost thirty years without the knowledge of the Foreign 
.----.. -·--· .... - .. ---------,- - ---- ------ -
- - - -- - -- - --M1n·i s try----~d cSften 1·11 opposition to its policies. The .Secret 
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was entirely characteristic of this weak king. He did not _____ have -------· ·--------· -----··-·-----··-----·----·--------•---'·--------·-·--·· _____ , ___________ ,, ___ -·-··-·-----------··-·--··re.:>\\:_ . --·------·----------
- ,, .. _______ ,, .. --------- ·-- --.-· .. ·-·· -·- --- --·-- -- - . 
the strength of character to force his ministers to adhere to 
his idee.s 111 foreign policy so he initiated his own diplomacy· 
8 Gooch, Loui .. s XV, pp .• - 212-213 • 
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11 
without their knowledge·. The .king, indeed, lived in fear that 
his ministers would discover his clandestine dealings. 9 Even 
when a foreign. minister, the Due de Cho1seul, became suspicious , 
of the Secret•s existence and jealously began jailing Louis' 
confidants, the monarch.made no use of his authority over his 
cabinet official. Instead, in an effort to save his agents, 
Louis summoned the officials in ~harge of the investigation and 
ordered them to cease their inquiry. Thus, he quashed the in-~ 
vestigation on the subordinate rather than the ministerial 
levei. 10 
The King's Secret had its origins in 1745 when a group 
of Polish noblemen asked the Prince of Conti, a member of the 
Cond' branch of the Bourbon family, to make himself ·available 
for election to the throne of Poland. The reigning King 
Augustus III, who was also the elector of Saxony, "t&ras in poor 
health and the nobles expected his demise imminently. Conti 
consulted with Louis X;./ and received the king's permission to 
', 
. seek the post to which Louis XIV had attempted to ~levate the 
prince's grandfather in 1697. 11 
Louis ani, Conti determined to seek the Polish throne. The 
' ' 
---I-king pledged cash subsidies to Conti to build a party in-. the ---~- "'-~: 
' 
-
----
---- --:Pe-1-1-sh---~Die t favorabre---t-o--the-princ e .. __, s-e-1---=--e-c ~ion. The king also-
--- ---------···---·-·-- .. ----·- ---:---_..::;=----
.• I 
,,f}}': 
_ __ ,.,,..-9James Breck Perkins ,____Frantra-rmde-r---Lcu-i-s-XV---,----V-0±-.---2-- tBo-s----· ~~-------'· -ton: Houghten--Mi-fflin and Co., 1897), pp 19)-197. · . -
l.O Ibid.·· Regarding ·Louis and his ministers, see also 
. G. P. Go_o .. c~~'rhe Character· of Louis XV", Contemporary Review, No. 107§ S:ll%f ~076 (1955), p. 28 and Po 950 -· . 
. ., . 
' 11Albert, Due de Broglie, The King 0 s Secret; Bein~ the Se-cret Corres~ondence of Lo~is rf with his Di lomatic Agents from 
·1752 to 177 (London: Cassell, Petter and Galpin, 1 79 ,PP• 9-lJ. \ 
~-
.-.,--~--.~~,. ....... ~~-=---··r:"'~i'.""'.~':: ... , .. ~~~-''i\":C,'.':'".;"~;:-~,;~:..-;,-::.;;..-..:;·~;:;-;;;:-..:;.;~-s;.,-1-.=.~:~.<\o);;t!.'..O'-'f-'.~·::.iu. ................ , .... ":'""-.----__._,_._ ' · ·. . · ,' . ~·b , - . ---,-~ 
gave his 
with the 
in order 
/ 
cousin permission 
French diploma~tic 
to 
•' ,. ,, .. 
··•-' 
enter 
resident 
to advance their schemes. 12 
into a correspondenoe 
. -
at Warsaw, M. I Castera, 
The pattern -I·or the oor-
respondence was set in its earliest days. Conti remained in 
Paris,as its director and he frequently reported the oourse 
of his dealings to Louis XV and received instructions from 
, the monarch. 
This correspondence was necessarily secret since 1ts·_ob-
jective contradicted certain aims of official French policy. 
In 1746, the Saxon royal family had been united with the Bour-
bons by the marriage of Princess Maria Josepha to the Dauphin. 
The following year, the French Fore1gn Minister, the Marquis 
Dl,Argenson, had concluded a subsidy treaty with Saxony. Of-
ficial ties between the two states were quit~ close and it 
would have proven embarrassing to all concerned had it become 
known that the king of France was working to block his daugh--
ter-in-law• s family from succeeding to a. throne they already 
held. 13 
At the very inception of "the King's Secret, then, the 
<:, 
I 
I 
, I 
12Ibid., p. 15. During the reign of Augustus III, France 
------~-c------U.l~n.tain-ed--tw0-----rep.resen-tat-i-v-e-s---i~:t1------P-oland.-.Th-e-- official--am:Oas--------~-., -
. 
sador to Poland tra ..veled 1rri th the Court of the I{ing)) ilugustus 
III. .As elector of Saxony 9 Augustus spent most of his reign.·',· 
in Dresden 9 journeying to Poland to open the Dieto Thus 9 th~ 
------,.,--:--:--c-------::::-:-re·ncfi e .. ml5a~saac5r--~o Polana-1~asou_-c_ of the country m1ich of . the --
time and his official residence was in Dresden. In his absence,. 
p French interests in Poland were ovetseerrby a French di~lomatic 
resident in Warsaw. 
13Ibid., pp 14-1;. 
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· division between the 'i,ims of France's secret and official 
~oreign policies was appar~nt. Foreign Minister D'Argenson 
was conce.:c:ned with the rising power of Russia in Ea.stern Eu-
rope, power which represented a threat to French influence·. in 
Poland from the time of Peter the Great. To prevent Russian 
domination of Poland, D'Argenson, and his immediate successor 
a.t the Foreign Ministry, attempted to make the best of the 
status quo. They sought to strengthen the Saxon king of Po-
land and to tie his family closer to France in order to ex-
·01ude Russian influence from the republic.14 The goal of the 
King's Secret was primarily dynastic_ rather than pol1cital. 
c-onti and hi·S agents sought the prince's election as king of 
Poland. A major consideration in this plan was tha~ the Saxon 
dynasty had to be kept weak to facilitate Conti' s ele_ction af-
ter Augustus III's death. 
The first years of the King's Secret were relati ie1ly un-
eventful, Augustus III lingered on and the question of the 
Polish succession remained dormant. In the meantime, Conti 
and Louis X:V perfected their syst_em o·f correspondence.· French 
ambassadors sympathetic to Cont1 1s candidacy were appointed to 
----------
--------- ---·····--·- - - --
---- -- --- ----- - -------
states neighboring Poland. The courts of Stockholm, Berlin 
and Constantinople all received French diplomats who eorre--------------------------------------·--------------·-----------------------------
---
. s ponded with Cbnti. These diplomats reported to Conti's 
--------------------------~-= -----=------14L. Jay Oliva 9 "France, Russia and the Abandonment of Poland: the Seven Years' War", Polish Review, Vol. 7, No. 2, (1962), PP• 65-66. 
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residence when they were in Paris. 1-5 An important link was 
added to the system when, in 1754, Conti enlisted the assist~ ~ 
ano_e of the pr~mier comm.is at the Foreign Ministry~ Jean-
Pierre Terci~r. The post of preaier commis_constituted a 
sort of department head within the ministry charged with han-
dling current diplomatic correspondence.16 With its own a-
gents and this new link to the official foreign policy, the 
Secret organizat-ion was, by 1-755, the French agency with the 
best knowledge· of· a.ff ai·rs in Eastern Europe •1? 
The uneventful initial years of the Secret•s existence 
came to an end in 1752. In that year, the post of ambassador 
'" to the king of Poland became vacant and Conti asked the king 
! 
! 
. I 
! 
I 
: I 
I 
I t· I 
! I 
I 
! ! 
, I 
i I I .. 
to use the opportunity to appoint a member of the King's Se-
cret_to the post. In this action, Conti sought to strengthen 
his network of correspondants •. Conti selected Charles-Francois, II 
. ~ 
I 
J / Comte de Broglie, to serve as ambassador as well as the Secret's 
agent in Poland. "From that moment the Comte de Broglie obeyed 
and received from the k-1.ng, through the Prince of i·!Conti., se-
"-
-~, 
cret orders for projects in Poland which were to be hidden from 
r'' . 
' ,-:;~, · 1 
l5Broglie, The King's Secret, Vol. I, pp. 16-17. I 
. i 
.·--··-··----·-···york: 
16
~~1~· R~~=~=~~' a:r~~:s~~n~h~9~if~~;;~t~5g:~~7~1 ~::··---~-- - \ 
so, Oliva, Polish Reviewi. P., 66. 
,. 1 
17011va, Polish Review1 p. 66. 1 
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his ministers."18 The new ambassador was.a thirty-one year 
old brigadier general who, though inexperienced in foreign 
policy, proved a vigorous representative. 
A mission to the Polish Republic was a challenge even 
for a skilled diplomat. Potentially, Poland was one of the 
strongest states in Europe. 19 However, in the mid-eighteenth 
century, Poland lay in a state of virtual anarchy. In the 
Polish republic, the nobles had triumphed over the king in 
"' that struggel for authority which most European states ex-
perienced in their_development. 20 
-The constitution which governed the republic was the 
chief cause of this anarchy. It had been created by the 
/ nobility with the aim of curbing royal authority as well as 
protecting noble rights. It accomplished these ends only too ·' 
well. The only real power remaining to the elected king was 
the appointment of various civil and ecclesiastical officials. 
Since- these officials held their office~ for life, however, 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 8 _
_
_
_
_
_
_
 -
-
-
-
... .._._.._-,.~ •. ,.. _
_
_
_
_
_
 _ 
18Memoir of Broglie to Louis XVI, May 13, 1774, re·-
~rinted in Emile Boutaric ( ed. ) , Cofre~ondan~~ secr~te in~'. edi te de Louis XV su1~ la poli tiSLue etra.ngere avec le Comte de Bro~lie Q Terc:1_~ 2 et~.0_2_ ~t .~utr~s documents relatifs au minist~re secret (Paris: Plon, 18b6J, Vol. 2, pp. 387=388. 
_, 
------··--···---·-~--· __ _ 
19Robert Howa:.rd Lo~d, The Second PartitioJl of Pola?ld~--------···j"' A Stu4¥ in DiE_lomatio History (Cambrid .. ge~ Masso: Harvard ;~ University Press 9 1915) 9 .PPo 25=26o See also Robert Ergang, 
E.".: ... f,:.:.,;.) . . = Europe from Renaissance to tfaterloo (Bostong Do Co Heath, -- --- :: 1954~ 9 PG 5350 In physical area. 9 • in 1764 9 Poland was the i· third la ..rges-.~ sta.e in Europe; her population WGtS 11 9 500,000, 
·~ making her the fourth most populous state in Europe behind [' 
'2~ 
France, Russia and Austria. I 
jt?;~ 20tord, Th~ Second Partition of Poland, pp. ?-8. [j 
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. 
the king lost all control of his app01nteeB onoe they were in-
-stalled in their positions. 21 ·( 
( 
The Diet, which endeavored to rule the state, wa~ a.n · 
. impotent body. It represented only the nobility and the 
,townsmen and peasants had no voi~e in its proeedings. The Diet 1 · 
had power to ma.ke all laws, levy taxes, declare tiar and make 
peace. The defect in-this system of government was the no-
bility's use of its right to use a 11berum veto. The veto 
cl 
by one delegate upon any piece of legislation not only stopped 
the consideration of the act to which he was opposed but also 
"exploded" the Diet. The explosion of the Diet meant the dis-
solution of the session~and the negation of all the work acted 
. r· 
upon prior to the veto. 
.. ; .....• 
' This Diet system did not even fulfill its goal of pro-
tecting the rights of all the nobles. Each noble was supposed 
to have a voice in the Diet through the representatives he el-
ected at local Dietines before the convocation of the main 
Diet. However, in .practice the Diet was dominated.by a·very 
few great families including the Czartoryski, t.he Potocki, 
the Radziwill. arid the Lu_bomirski. These :f'al'llilies rallied 
their adherents for internecine political and ijfilitary strug-
t' 
effect these altercations had o~_ the republic. 
The paralysis of goveitnment under such a syst;em was al-
. j_. ·-· 
mo.st total. The Diet legally me.t once every two ·years for a 
. ,., 
~
1Ib1d., pp. 10-11. ~- ~ .. · 
J·, 
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six week session. 22 Yet, betweenl1695 and 1762, twelve Diets 
dissolved without even accomplishing the preliminary step of 
choosing a presiding officer. Of all the Di~ts held between 
.1652, the year in whic~h the use of the liberum veto became an 
accepted practice, and 1762, all but seven sessions were "ex-
ploded ... One third of the "exploded" Diets were terminated 
by the veto of a single deputy. 23 
Even w.,i th this system of government, a strong king such 
as Jan Sobieski could establish order in the state. However, 
the ruler of Poland in the mid-eighteenth century, Augustus III, 
was no Sobieski. The king, also elector of Saxony, preferred 
Dresden to Warsaw. His long absences from Poland and his lack 
. -
or·1nterest in its government increased anarchy in the repub-
lic.24 The king left the Polish government to his first min-
ister, the Saxon Count Heinrich Bruhl, a man who amassed a 
personal fortune at the expense of the state. 
-------------·--·.,_...,A ______ ,...,..._ ________ _ 
22 
The Diet met at Warsaw but every third meeting was held 
at Grodno in Lithuania, a .. n ac.kno1ATledge1nent of the fact that the 
republic itJas ·the result of tl1e joining of Pola~nd and Li thua .. nia. 
For a concise study of Polish government 9 see w. Fo Reddaway, 
tl•alo 9 The Cambridge HistoE.Y: of Poland (Cambridgeg Cambridge 
University Press 9 1941)~ PPo 49-710 On Diet procedure 9 see 
Saul Ko Padover (edo) 9 G0The First Partition of Pole ..ndg Selec-
t 
tive Documents~ Procedure of the Polish Diet", Slavonic and ~ 
-------............... ~·------~~ .. s.t ..... Eurapean Review~ Vol$ .... l4 ........ .(..1.936) 9 .. , PPe ..... 68.S~ .. 68.9 .• : .... ., ......... ., ........... ~· ----·--·---- · ··-· ··· -·· ··---
L. 
23Erga.ng, E11rope from Rena .. issance to Waterloo, p. 540~• -· 
--·---~-·-----·------~-----~-
.. 
24J. J. Vernier 9 "~Un ~pi;ode de la vie du Prince !ran9ois-
Xavier de Saxe, Comte de Lusaceg sa candidature au trone de 
Pologne•, ~~moires a.e la soc~ete aC8 .. d~1¥ique d O ~gSricul ture, des 
sciences 2 arts, belles-lettres du d~partemen.t de L' Aube, Ann~e, 
19001 Ser. 3, T. 37, pp. J64-365. 
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In addition to her governmental anarchy, Poland had other 
problems. 
Polish. 
' . . ..\' 
·,"-;,. '!- ~.-. ·-
,s::.-, 
.. , 
Only fifty per cent of the· state's inhabitants were 
\ 
The rest of 'the republic's population consisted of \ 
·' · Germans, Lithuanians and Russians. These national groups 
with.in the republic were generally non-Ca tho lies. The Li th-
uanians and Russians were predominantly Orthodox while the· 
Germans were Lutherans or Calvinists. The problem of these 
minorities was compounded by the government's religious pol-
icies. 
Poland had been one of the'most tolerant -states of Europe. 
-This religious tol~erance ended when Jesuits entered the coun-
try to stem Polish Catholic defection to the new faiths of the 
Reformation. Under the influence of the Jesuits, Poland's 
former tolerance was transformed into religious bigotry. A 
1717 law fqrbade non-Catholics, or Dissidents, to build new 
churches while acts of the Diet in 1733 and 1736 shear·ed the 
non-Catholics of their political and civil rights. The Dis-
sidents looked to their respective co-religionists outside of 
- . 
Poland to relieve their plight. Russia became a champion to 
the Orthodox while the Protestants turned toward Prussia and 
Sweden. 25 The non-Catholic residents of Poland constituted a 
·~--·-------· --~-----· ---- --·--·--····-·"·····-······· .......... .,.,-'···· ····--···-·····-····"···"·"'·"'"'•'" ,,,..,,,.,., .. ·•··•·· .............. ,, .. , .. _ ... _,,_, ..... _., .. - ,_ .. ,. ........... . 
,,,,«,,.- • •' .. ,,•,-,_,._ ....... ,.,•,••,•~••• ,., .. ,,, .,.:; ,.<O,'-•'"''', • ,_,,_., ._ ,,,,. ,,, ''•> ,, •• •,•,-,h'.•"• -., ,,c, •-' -'•L"•••••••, Uo ><'L"•"'"" >•••< '•' ,._,.,._,,,,. >•' <'''>''""•''-''•'>,•,•,a,••~«·~•,<',• ... •,.,,;,._,,._,,, •. ,.-,.->.L.~~·V•••"""'"'~'"''•''''".0'·_.., •• ,,, ••'~'''°''"""'•'."'""•"' ,•>•> •'<«..-,•,- ,., ... ,,, ... ,.,. .... ~ ............. _ •. __ _ 
large, dissatisfied group within the republic as a result of 
these policies. 
in Poland. 
Their plight encoura_ged fore:i.gn intervention 
25Ergang, Eurb1>,8 from mma:isisance to Waterloo, p. ·· 540 • 
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19 
Finally f"' 5'·the -Polish state was largely undefended. The Car-· 
---
pa thian Mountains on her southern border constituted the·re-
public's only natural line of defense. Furthermore, the 
country was militarily weak. In 1717, the Diet limited the 
army to 24,000 men because of .1ts fear that a larger force 
might be used to strengthen the king. This army\; ma.inly cav-
alry, possessed very little infantry and artillery and was 
seldom up to legal strength. 26 
' Many Polish nobles were undisturbed by~he condition of 
their country. They apparently believed that since_the re-
.public was harmless it would nott be bothered by its neighbors. 
The maxim ''Poland subsists through her anarchy" seems to have 
. 
~ 
expressed the outlook of many nobles. 27 Yet, despite the 
great weaknesses of the republic and the apathy of much of 
its ruling class, there were nobles in Poland concerned by 
the state's ills. I 
Three parties advanced solutions to the republic's dif-
f~lties. The powerful Czartoryski family sought a radical 
. - ' 
reform in government. Czartoryski leaders recognized that 
Poland could net continue in its anarchy and proposed sweeping 
governmental reforms and the abolition of the liberum veto. 
.__ --~ 
-----
The Czartoryski and their adhe,Pants----we~e---0pp0-S-ed---DY--the--------------~------------.,---------------
equally powerful Potocki -family whieh led a group ef son-- .. ·-----~-~-·-
serti ve nobles seeking limited changes in the existing form 
26 Ibid., p. 541. 
27Lord, The Second Partition of Poland, p. Ji~ 
·-
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20 
of government. A third party of nobles clustered around 
... 
Count Bruhl. Bt-iihl endeavored to build a court party in 
the Dtet which aimed at the abolition of the elective mon-
archy and the substitution of a hereditary kingship under the 
Saxon dynasty. The effor.ts of these parties to attain their 
goals continued the strife-marked tradition of Polish pol1-
_.,, 
tics. Unfor·tunate~y,. these ·parties continued anot_her prac-
tice comm-on in the history of the republic's politics; this 
tradition was the appeal by Polish nobles to foreign champions 
for their causes. 
.. ' 
In the seventeenth century warring Polish nobles first ' •• ~I 
.. 
appealed to foreign states for assistance against their poli-
, 
. 
tical opponents. The extreme weakness of the state and the~· 
existence of oppressed national and ,religious minorities 
within Poland eliciting the sympathy of foreign governments 
led to intervention in the republic. There arose French, 
Austrian and Russian parties among the Polish nobility. The,e 
parties were maintained by foreign subsidies for the purpose 
of influencing Polish elections. 28 Each major European 
power generally supported a candidate in the election favorable 
to its own interests. Thus, when the question of governmental 
,.,::f/. 
_ .. ---=- _, - - ---- --- -- ·----- - -
ref_orm. arose, the various parties looked for foreign .. support~_ 
- -- - .. ·---··· ----·-·- - - - -- -----------------------------------·---------·--·-·-----·-·----~·---···--···------------·--·--- -
In the past, the Potocki group had been among the nobles con- _ 
~- ~~~ 
- --·--, ··-··-· -----
_,;,_,,, . 
stituting a French party. They sought French support for 
I t ·• 
their programs while the Czartoryski and their adherants 
looked to Russia. As for the major powers, the perennial 
28Ibid. , p. 33. 
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nature of P·o11sh p.011 tical embroilments dictated that each 
had well-de:rined Polish policies by 1752. In order to under-
t~ 
stand France's position in Poland, the goals of the other 
', 
· powerful European states must be .examined. 
Britain, under Newoas tle' s 1 eadership, turned· .1 ts main 
attention toward Saxony. In the 1750 1 s, Britain was engaged 
1n signing subsidy treaties with German princes to maintain ·.:, 
the balance of power against· France and to insure Hanover's 
safety in the event _of war. An. influential British diplomat, 
S1r C.harles Hanbury Williams, ambassador to Saxony, linked 
Newcastle's plan to another scheme. Williams sought to as-
sure Austrian Archduke Joseph's success in the next Imperial 
election. Each.subsidy treaty required that a signatory state 
pledge its electoral vote to the archduke, Britain's ally. 29 
Thus, in 17.50, Bavaria joined the group of German states sub-
sidized by Britain, followe¢t in 1751 by Saxony.JO Saxony 
joined the British alliance system after the expiration of her 
1 
1747 treaty with France, a __ fact which no doubt heightened 
French concern for the alignment of Poland. 
29n. B. Horn, The British D, lomatio Service 1689-1789 (Oxford: c··1arendon Press, 19 1 ~- pp. 1 -1 • 
JO . 
"\ ·, 
·.• 
~ -- a --------------~-
· Sir Charles Hanbury Wi_lliams._ !.l \6Jorks. o o From the Orig- • _______ _ 
inals in the Possession of his Grandsono00the Earl of Essex 
with notes by Horace vlalpole 9 Earl of Oxford (Londong Jef-
frey 'i) 1822') 9 Volo 2 9 PPo ·- 208=211 o See also 9 La .. wrence Henry 
Gipson~ The British Empire Before the American Revolution, 
Vol. VI (New York:· Knopf, 1946), p. 367. 
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• 
Austria contested French influence in Poland because a 
Franco-Polish alliance spelled a definite threat to the Haps-
burgs. Austria had pften, as in 1683, sought a Polish alliance~ 
and, generally, relations between the two states were friendly. 
Austria had the most immediate interest in·maintaining an.in-
dependent Poland bec~~u.se French, Prussian er perhaps even Rus-
sian influence over the republic presented a serious threat to 
the Hapsburgs.31 
Russian influence in Poland had been on the increase since 
the days of Peter the Great. Fo·~ Russia~.,_ Poland had been both 
a_gateway and a barrier to Europe. Russia had felt the force 
of Polish armi- during its "time of troubles" and. determined to 
maintain the republic as a_ gateway rather than a barrier. Con-l 
sequ.ently, Russia's policy was directed toward maintainence of 
,, .. 
..... 1,. 
the Polish liberties, that is the stati1s quo~, Russ.ia had pur.;;. .-.~~~~- - -
sued h~r Polish policy with less vigor under Empress Elizabeth 
due to the amiable relations which that ruler maintained with 
the Saxon court after the War of the Austrian Succession. This 
friendship decreased Russian influence in Poland and as a re-
sult, by 1752, the empress' party in the republic enjoyed 
less prestige than formerly. 
Prussia remained a constant threat to Poland because 
i: 
I 
I 
. I 
I 
I 
I 
.~ 
-,~ 
! Polish lands separated the scatte:r~g. _ Hoh~enzollern possess ions. ___________ --~ J 
-
' 
Prussian rul'e .. bf Polish Prussia. would link East Prussia with 
.Pomerania while a section of Great Pole ..nd tfould enable the 
..:;;~:::.•,• ., ... 
-------------------=---------------...... -------
31tord, The Second Partition of Poland, pp. J8-39. 
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.. Hohenzollerns to join ii'ewly-acquired Silesia ·with East Pr11:s-~" 
_,."'"> 
""' ... 
sfa. Consequently, Frederick II worked. against reforms in 
"" 
"~ 
\ 
Poland's axJ.archio government. Prussia sought to prevent any 
power hostile to its interests ,from gaining control. of Poland}2 
The Ottoman Empire, though hardly a great power by the mid-
eighteenth century, also had an interest in Poland. Turkey sup-
·-,_ 
ported an independent Poland in order to block Russf~an expansion. 
In 1_711, the Turks defeated Peter the Great in a B9.lkan War and 
forced the czar to sign the Treaty of Pruth renouncing all fu-
' . 
ture Russian intervention in Polish arfairs. When the Russians 
-~·· . 
violated the treaty's provisiorts, the Porte claimed the defense 
,. 
of Poland as its legal right.33 In 1768, the Turks would take 
up arms against Russia as a result of that power's intervention 
in Poland. 
_,..,,, ' 
!, 
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France opposed Russian or Prussian control of hJtr old Po-
lish· ally. However, the War of the Polish Succession proved 
that France was too far away from the republic to provide 
sufficient aid against an Eastern European power. France, 
then, had to devise e .. means of preserving Poland which ,did not 
require a military commitment. 
- - - ·- -- - ---- ···- .-- -
;_~ . 
Franc·e 's inability to act mili taril-y in· Eastern Europe 
1 
...,, 
meant that the:ee was only one way to preserve Poland. The 
republic had to be strengthened so that it could defend ·1tself. __ , -~,',·-
32Ib1d., pp. 38-40. 
· 33R. B~ Mowat, A History o~ropean DiplomaCy, Vol.1 I: 
1451-1789 (New York: Longmans, Green and Coo, 1928), p. 267. 
-Se~ also Reddaway, Cambridge History of Poland, p. 90. 
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Thus, ,~reign Minister D'Argenson advocated the reinvigoration ( 
-- --· -- ,,,- ____ '_.,_ :.lT .)""-.:..·;:•·· -. -! 
.... 
of Poland through an alliance with Saxony. Unfortunately, D' Ar- " .. 
genson's numerous successors at the Foreign Ministry after 
1747 lapsed into the negative goal of simply frustrating real 
or imagined Russian ambitions in Poland. Too often, as in 
1752, this policy manifested itself in disruption of the Diet. 
, Official French foreign polioy did nothing to restore order 
"----1 n the republic and such a restoration was a prerequisite 
for a stronger Poland. 
The King's Secret also failed to recognize the need.to 
strengthen Poland. The Secret aimed at placing Conti on the 
Polish throne·. Although the French prince certainly wanted 
Poland 'preserved, he opposed any strengthening of the Saxon 
dynasty. A reinvigorated Saxon rule in Poland might prevent 
Conti's election to the Polish crown. Moreover, Conti!s op-
eratives increased disorder in Poland by engaging in the 
republic's politics to build a party favorable to his can-
d1dacyo34 
Frenoh Polish polioy in the 1750's thus was divided and 
failed to recognize the need for a strengthened Poland. The 
-result of this lack of vision and dichotomy in policy was a 
. ·------,---~ ~i~---.-~:_:_ ____ _majo.r diploma tic def eat for Louis XV' s government-. --Thi-s- de--------------~~--- -
feat emerged over a period of about twelve years and must be 
flt, 
viewed against. the background of European events during th~ 
period 1752-1764. The study of France's defeat in Poland may 
--------------------------··"'""""" -----
J41ord, The Second Partition of.Poland, pp. '.37-JS. 
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be divided into three pha~es corresponding to changes in 
-, 
-France's diplomatic position in Europe. The first phase of 
France's Polish debacle·.- occurred. during the years 1752-1750; 
In 1752,·,-the King's Secret began to take a more active role 
I •L,/ . •, 
in Polish politics with the appointment of the energetic 
secret agent, the C.omte de Broglie, as French ambassador to 
Poland. This first phase ended as France's European alli-
ances were radically changed by the Diplomatic Revolution of 
1756-. The second phase of __ . the French defeat spanned the years 
of the Seven ·Years' War, 1756-1763. The final phase was 
., 
marked by the realities of France's decreased strength after 
th~ Treaty of Paris and ended in the election q_f Russia's can-
didate as King of Poland in 1764. 
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CHAPTER II 
....... 
·.O:.: FRENCH POLICY, 1752-1756 
The first phase of French defeat·. in Poland opened with 
the 1752 appointment of the c··omte de ~,·,Broglie as ambassador 
, to the republic as the a.gent of the King's secret. Broglie 
had the opportunity to take 1mmedie ..te action in Poland since 
his appointment occurred in a Diet year. The Polish Diet 
met at Grodno, Lithuania in 1752. Many Polish nobles ex-
pected this session to produce at least moderate reforms 
in the governmental system. •• Count Bruhl and his party spon-
sored a plan to confirm a Saxon prince on the Polish throne \ 
before Augustus III's death. Because of Augustus~ precarious 
'• health, Brti.hl sought the Diet's approval of a Saxon prince in 
order to avoid an interregnum and international crisis similar 
to that which followed Augustus II's death in 1733. B~uhl's 
plan entailed limited parliamentary reform includi.;r1g abolition 
of the. divisive system of royal elections. 1 Bruhl r·eoognized 
th·e,-_-uselessness of the Polish throne to the Saxon dynasty if 
,: 
~ l 
I 
l 
. l 
., 
j 
··\ 
·-- .. . ... .... .... .. -- --····--··-···-- - ...... -··· ........ order were not restored· · · in t-h e ···republ·i·c-.··"··"· -·· ·· · · ····· · ............. -."··-····· ....... ",.~·--.. ,..m ••.•••.• ; • .,._"_ ••• - ... - •• - ..... .,-... ·------~~·-·=·-~-__;...~---.. -·--~""·-·· 
.- ',: .... -·,~- 4i ... , ··. -~ ... '._ .i .• 
• ,' I • 
The 1752 Diet wa·s not the first session to .. which Briihl-- -- . 
submitted his program. In 1750, the Potocki family frus- · 
trated Bruhl' s efforts -to pass his legisla.ti ve .programs. 
-----,----------------------------
1Reddaway, Cambridge History of Poland, pi. ,,,..-J6. 
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However, by 17 5~, the _ politic al olimEtte in Poland had changed. 
Bru.hl not only retained support of the .. reformist Czartoryski 
family but he lso gained new allies.2 Saxony accepted the 7~--------_-
Bri tish sUbsidy treaty in 1751 and Brii.hl obtained additional 
support for his program from the British ambassador, Sir 
Charles Hanbury Williams. Williams proved a valuable ally 
- .. - t 
because he succeeded in obtaining St. Pe·tersburg' s support 
for Bruhl' s . plan. 3 Al.-though Austria appeared unwilling to 
support the Saxon minister, few believed that Ma~ia Theresa 
would oppose a plan sponsored by her British and Russian 
allies.4 Furthermore, the deaths of several Potocki leaders 
in 1751 and 1752 enabled Brlihl to appoint his allies to state 
offices formerly held by his conservative opponents. The , 
Bruhl and c·zartoryski factions monopolized the higl1est state 
off.ices by 1752. 5 Therefore, Bruhl believed the time ripe to 
re.submit his program to ·the Diet. 
of success proved false. 
However, his expectations 
B~th the secret and official· instructions to the Comte 
de Broglie were directed at exploding the 1752 sessions of 
.. ,., 
the Diet. ~he French foreign minister, the Marquis derSaint-
Contest, sought the explosion of the Diet because of an in-
' 
-•·\ I 
............................ ~,---·-----------------------------.....--..,.....,·-.z.i .. ,~ .... -u;Q 
-- ... - - - . --·----------··-·· ~-•---'--·---
• -••· ·- -- •-•-•" •••--•-,<.-' •" -~-••••••,-~~.•-·---• -••M-••»-•··---·, ·--~---•-- •--~---•-••·-••'••--••· ••-. --·--•••••-••••·--•••---·-·--... --- . --~ 
2Do B. Horn, Sir Charles Hanbur. Williams and Euro ean 
DiploinB~CY,· 1744-17 ~~-. London: __ George G. Harrop, Ltd., l:9:30), 
p. 127. 
3Beddaway, Cambrid~e History of Poland, p. 36. 
4Horn, Williams and European Diplomacy, 127.;;12a~·"' 
... 5Ibid. ···, 
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correct analysis of Polish poli.tics. Amiable rel·ations be-
tween Saxony, Austria and Russia led the Foreign Mini·stry to ,, 
•• o-oncTude tnat--~ruhl planned· to lead Poland away_, from its neu-
-tral i ty and into an anti-French alliance with the imperial 
powers. Furthermore, the foreign minister believed that a 
"" 
treaty of alliance would be proposed at Grodno in /1752. 6 In 
order to prevent the acceptance of._ such a treaty, Saint-Contest 
insturcted Broglie to effect the Diet's dissolution. Broglie's 
instructions named Poles expected to aid his project but the 
document als
1
0· specified that the ambassador was not to commit 
his king to aJny candidate for the Polish crown. .If questi.o.ned r 
on France's position in the next election, Broglie was only to 
state his monarch's affection for Augustus III and Louis "X:.V' 1 s 
support of free elections.? Broglie's instructions also di-
rected him not to support Bruhl's reform plan • 
..,,... 
It. is significant that Fred.erick the Great recognized the· 
.ultimate effect of Broglie I s misst·on. While en route to the 
Polish Diet, Broglie visited Frederick at Breslau and informed ,, 
. '"''=% 
him of his official instructions. Frederick reacted favorably 
to the dete .. ils of this "'"disclosure and urged the French govern-
.• J;-h'° . 
-··.. - ' . 
ri-
ment to give Broglie more ~nergetic instr_uctions of the same 
gerire:----·'"Tne~·-k i ng r-e-arr-z·efd--tlia:t.: .. 'Fre'ri.6 h Oh p"o 1 i c y··- r'e f 1 e d t e·d·-'- in·~-~~~----·--·--·· ------~ 
---·( 6 I 
; Ibid. , p. 1J4. 
. ? "Instructions du roi1 a.u sieur Comte de Broglie ••• le 14 juillet 1752, it in CoIILinission des archives diplomatiques, Recueil · des instructions d_o11nees aux ambe .. ssGtdors et ministres de France ...... . r . ...... err =e:--rr:s.-de uis les traites de Westphalie jus u'~ la revolution fran ais, Vol. Vg Pologne, ed. by Louis Farges Pari~: F. A.lean, 18 8, 
PP• 111 .... 126. 
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Broglie's instructions pre·sented no solution to Poland's an-
archy. A weak Poland facilitated future Prussian expansion. 8 
"( 
c·onti 's secret instructions to the c·omte de Broglie aimed ~-~~--·---- ---
\ 
at the French prince's election to the Polish-throne. These 
f"' 
instructions obliged Broglie to work for ·the Diet's explosion ) 
. 
since Bruhl would present the Saxon· cand_idature at Grodno. Thus, 
< 
the secret and official orders both.required the Diet's explosion. 
Conti, however, difrered from Saint-Contest's political neu-
trality by epjoining upon Broglie the creation of a party among 
the Polish nobles favorable to a French candidacy for the crown. 
C.-Onti I s instructions listed nobles amenable to his candidacy. 
Many of these nobles were partisans of the reactionary, pro-
French Potocki party.9 
This second part of the secret instructions· crea_ted a 
dilemma for Broglie. c·onti advocated positive steps in pre-
paration for the next election while the foreign minister ad- .... 
vised his ambassador to remain neutral in Polish politics. 
Conti advised Broglie to resolve these contradictory instruc-
tions by persuading the Foreign Ministry to SUP!)ort the French 
. , " ' 
. princes candidacy. Broglie had to acco-mplish this- difficult 
J;J 
task without revealing the King's Secret to Saint-Contest. 10 
. --------·--· -·~ -·---·····-""" ... ~.The .... D.i._et ..... ,,.c..con:u:e.n.ed.---at _____ G:r .. Q.dP.-Q.,, ..... Q!!_~ .. 9~ to be r ____ ;L_, _____ l __ 2.5._2 __ .. ________ _B:r.:iJ.h.1 ____ ~-------------·-·---·-··--
J,J 8 
Comte de Broglie to the Marquis de Saint-Contest, Sep-
tembe~ 17, 1752; in Broglie, The King's Secret, Vol. I, pp. 35-37. 
9 
"Instructions du roi au sieur Comte de Broglie in RecueiLr. , . 
••• Pologne~ pp. 111-126. See also, Broglie, The King's Secret, Vol. Ij Po 34. 
10Pr1nce de Conti to Co1Ilte de Broglie, September ~6, 1752, in Recueil~-~ .Pc,logp.e, pp. 127-133. 
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presented a moderate reform program P,roviding for an improved 
- judicial system, settlement of several bounda .. ry disputes with 
Russia and, most importantly, a slight change in the consti-
tution. --- The constitutional e .. mendment specified that, upon an 
unanimous vote of the Diet, the judicial and boundary reforms 
would become law. Furthermore, any issues raised by the en-
, actment of these reform\ and presented to the Diet would not 
be subject to the liberum veto. The proposed reforms were 
attempts to limit the veto. :. Shortly ar·t=etr~t}te introduction 
of these reforms an obscure noble exploded the Diet on Oo-
tOber 24, 1752. 11 The matter of the Saxon succession was not 
I 
even raised at the session and Grodno proved to be one more 
defeat in the struggle for reform. · 
It is quite possible that the Diet would have been ter-
minated even without the Comte de Broglie's presence at Grodno. 
Although Bruhl and the Czartoryski controlled the majority of 
thejdelegates, the Potocki family had not been entirely ex-
cluded from the Diet. Th1~e presence of the Potocki' group, 
•• 
aided by Broglie's liberal ·bribes, doomed Bruhl's reforms from 
the start. 12 
In_the aftermath of the Diet's collapse, Polish a.n1mo-
-· ------
' 
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si ties greatly intensified. Bruhl, the Czarto-ryski--a.nd ·th·e---
Saxon court took cogn.izance of Broglie •--s----r-o-le a.t the Diet and 
\.\, 
11 H-orn, Williams and European Diplomacy, pp. 134-135. 
_ l2Ibid., pp. 1J5-1J6. ~'. .. ,~_-
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grew angry at the prospect of renewed French interference in 
Poland. 1 :3 Broglie• s actions after the Diet further increased 
_,' .... ,,,,·~-·~ 
tension between the Saxon court and the French ambassador. 
When the court returned to Dresaen, Broglie remained in Po-
land distributing bribes to nobles. The count succeeded in 
converting the .Polish army commander, Great General Branioki, 
to· the cause o"f the French party. Then when the amba ", ador 
finally rejoined the court, he created more 111 will b·ld~~ 
manding privileges in court etiquette which were never enjoyed 
by his predeoessors. 14 Broglie thus sought to increase the 
prestige of the French ambassador in order to gather support 
for his cause. 
. :~ '. 
Broglie·' s partisan activities in Poland violated h·is of-· 
ficial instructions and soon Briihl was not the only individual 
annoyed by the French ambJssador•s behavior. Broglie drew 
hea ..vy criticism from Saint-Contest .. at the Foreign Ivtinistry .15 , 
The_ count's mission moreover, was costly._ BY the middle of 
1754, the count had expended a "hundred thousand and odd 11-
vres"- ~-t.nce his departure from Paris a scant two years ea$er. 
13:aroglie, The King's Secret, Vol. I, P• 60. 
• t• 
. . . .. ---·~~Ib!<!• , p. 70. When Brogli:e-l~ft Po1a.nQh:1s s~cret-ary, .. ---------·----·-······-·-··----------·'··-~--------___..·M~ Thomelin, was left in charge of French inter'e-s-t-s in Poland because of the death of the diplomatic resident 9 Mo C21 .. st~ra • 
.... 
In 1753 ~ Bs .. ron de Jaku ..bowslri became diploma .. tic residento He was a member of the King 0 s Secret as -vrere l1is su.ccessors S) ~'.I. de la Fayardie (1753=1754) 9 and Mo Dl:trand de Distroff (1755~1760). See Recue1loooPologne 9 ·po 135 9 Po 139, p. 145 and pp. 153-154 •. 
;' 15 
l Broglie, The Kingis Secret, Vol. I, p. 70. 
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U1l.1nformed of Broglie's secret dealings, Saint-Contest re-
-
-
fused to reimburs·e the count for his expenses. These ex-
penses represented bribes to Polish nobles and maintenance 
,of the living standard expected of a French ambassador en-
gaged in building e .. party among this high-living group of 
men. 16 Broglie wrote the king for funds. The problem of in-
sufficient funds appeared quite.frequently in th~ _King's Se-
{ 
cret correspondence. The personal budge.t with which Lou.is x.v· 
supported the Secret was inadequate to meeting the expenses of 
a personal diplomacy which sometimes cost up to 10,000 livres 
1 a month. 7 Broglie received-some :financial aid from Louis X:V 
but the count•s continuing financial difficultie~ adde~ to 
the dilemma of,l>rying to satikfy two masters, :prompted Broglie 
to offer his resignation. Louis XV, however, rejected the rr-
signation and Broglie remained in Poland. 18 · 
The turmoil in Poland.resulting from the Diet of 1752 
had not yet subsided when new problems beset the republic • 
•• After Grodno, Bruhl gave up_,his attempts at reform and aban-
doned the court party. The minister began to use the poli-
~ tical patronage at his disposal as a source of income and not 
,. 
as an instrument to build an alliance of nobles loyal to the 
·- - - ··~--- -~ -~·-·-········~ ' "-~--~---~--.------------·-
16 · 
c·omte de Broglie. to Marquis de Saint-Contest, Dresden·, June 25 9 1754; in ibido ~ PPo 65~66. · ---
.i;-·--... ·-, ~--:, 
17 Sanche de Gramont,-Epitaph for Kings (New York: 
Putnam's Sons, 1.967), ~_l>{f 174-175. 
18 Broglie, The King's Secret., Vol. I., p. 69. 
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- Saxon line._ The abandonment of this program weakened the al-
., 
liance between Bruhl _and the ref·ormist Cza."t'toryski family. This 
,~liance, strained by the failu·re to pass reform legislation at 
' - ~ 
I" 
Grodno, finally terminated as,a result of the Ostrog aff~ir.19 
The majorate of Ostrog we .. s a large estate. Its possession 
had been in dispute since 1722 when the family of the original 
owners died out. Januz 'sanguszko, the rtt'.fble who held the es-
tate in 1753, found himself in financial diff icut~,es and en-
, 
deavored to improve his situation by selling his lands to the 
Czartoryski family. The deal created an uproar among the im-
portant Polish nobles since almost all of them advanced claims 
' i 
to the Ostrog.lands.20 /~ 
The Comte ~e Broglie also deeply invorved himself in the · 
Ostro~ affair. The ambassador-agent ~pursued several: courses 
of action to frustrate this purchase which, if concluded, would: 
enhance the position of his Czartoryski opponents. -The count 
'J 
continued the bribery of Polish nobles which he began at 
Grodno, and Broglie's new ally, Great General Branicki, as-
sumed the leadersl1.ip of theJ nobles oppo·sed to the Czartoryski 
purchase. The general alleged that - the new ownership of_ the 
Ostrog territories would endang~r the supply of six hundred 
·~---tm+-11---cr-i---l-i~t-i-amen----ml-i~n--t-he -estate lands __ !1_~re o 1?.l!_g~d _ to __ :R~QYic!e _i_~ 
---- - 19 _ .. 
Horn, Willia ..ms and Eu1'"'opean Diplomacy, p. 159 and 
Reddaway, Cambridge History of Poland, p. 37. 
20ReoueilooooPologne 9 p. 157 ~d Reddaway, aambrid5e 
History of Poland, pp. J7-J8 •. 
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defense of Ruthenia. While Branicki was· advancing his spe-
cious argument, __ Broglie set his second plan of action in motion. -~ 
---------~ - ------- ----- -··· The count allegedly unearthed docum.ents e·stablishing Louis XV' s 
claim to the Ostrog estate through the king's marriage to 
Marie Leczinska. This claim gave the French ambassador a voice 
in the ~ettlement of the Ostrog problem. 
The Ostrog question was raised at the 1754 Diet. At that 
session, Broglie and Branicki generated such intense oppo~ition 
to the Czartoryski that the family was prompted to explode the 
Diet. 21 As a result of the Diet's dissolution, Augustus III 
and Bruhl,exercised the little authority remaining to the Po-
lish -crown. They placed the Ostrog estate under the super-
•• vision of commissid>ners chosen by Bruhl from the Potocki camp. 
•• 
• Bruhl's motives in shifting his favor from the Czartoryski to 
the Potocki have not been definitely established~ Perhaps the 
-minister was attempting to form another coalition in order to 
reestablish royal authority. Broglie suggested another motive. 
He. alleged that Bruhl was bribed by a noble of the Poto_cki group 
' 22 µsing fund~ supplied by the French ambassador. In either 
case, Bruhl' s dec(ision on the disposition of the Ostrog estate· 
marked the f.inal break between the minister and the Czartoryski. 23 ·· · 
.. This break barely preceded a rupture in reLations hatween-B-:r-u~h-i--1-----~_....____ ----~---------~-------------- -------------- -- - . . - ---
·····~···· · 
21Broglie~ The~in§ 0 s Secret, Vol. I, pp. 76-79 and Reddaway, Cambridg~~qistori of Poland, pp. 37-38. 
22B:roglie 9 The King's Secret, Vol. I, p. 8:1,J 
2
.3Horn, Williams and European Di;elomacy, p. 159. 
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and the British ambassador. W.illiams chos~ the side of the 
Czartoryski in the Ostrog ques_tion and lost Briihl' s favor. 24 
Def ea.ted on the Ostrog que~tion, the Czartoryski found··· 
most of Poland united against them under Broglie's leadership. 
T~e fa .. mily was r·oreed to seek allies outside of the republic. 
They found a ready ally in Sir Charles Hanbury Williams since 
"\ ., 
the British ambassador had lost his alliance with Bruhl. ·Wil-
\ 
11, liams provided the Czartoryski with a second foreign ally. 
In the summer of 1755, the British government dispatched 
Williams to, Russia. Stanislas Poniatowski·, a relative of the 
Czartoryski, accompanied-Williams to St. Petersburg. In the 
Russian capital, the British diplomat introduced Poniatowski 
to Grand Duchess Catherine. The nolitical results of the re-.. 
lationship which developed between the Polish noble and Cathe-
rine provide·d stronger ties between the Czartoryski family and 
the future czarina. The non-political results of the liaison 
were of a romantic nature. 25 
~ 
Another result of Williams' mission to Russia was the 
subsidy trea.t?y which the ambass·ador concluded with Emuress 
'Elizabeth. The terms of this Treaty of St.Petersburg of 
September 30, 1755, provided for Russia to aid Britain with 
- 24 Williams, Works, Vol. 2, p. 209 •. · 
, I . 
25Ibid., p. 211 and Reddaway, Cambrid~e Hi~tor~f Poland, 
.p. 38. I 
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return, Britain promised cash subsidies to St.Petersburg as 
well as assistance in securing the passage·of Russian troops 
through Pcii.and to Germany. In a secret article of the tre~ty, 
the two po1-1ers agreed to keep each other informed of a11, of 
·' 
their relations with "the common enemy", that is, Prussia. 26 
In France, the Anglo-Russian negotiations generated a 
flurry of diplomatic activity. Versailles was not yet aware 
of the details of the St. Petersburg Treaty. However, Louis x:v· 
and Conti correctly recognized that, should war erupt, any 
link between St. Petersburg and London would bring Russian 
tro·op~ across Poland and., into Germany for Hanover's defense. 
Other matters also occupied Versailles' attent~on at this time. 
Even before the opening of the Anglo-Russian talks, the king re-
• 
ceived proposals from aount Kaunitz suggesting a rapprochement 
between France and Austria. In the course of th~'discussions 
--, \ 
\ w1 th Au~.tria, Kauni tz add.ed weight to his case by 'claiming 
that Louis XV's ally, Frederick the Great, was conducting 
secret negotiations with Britain. In 1755, France was already 
engaged in a naval war with Britain. Now the nation was cqn-
fronted by what appeared to be an emerging anti-French coali-
tion joining Prussia and Russia to Brit n. Confirmation of 
·--- ... -·-·--.--····· - -- -~----- -- . 
~ . . 
- . -- - ---- -- - - --
-. --···---. --.. -----·~------·-----Pruss-1.a's negotiations with Britain s on reached the French 
26Richard Wadd.ingtonll Lou.is 1.~ et le renversement d.es alliances g . r~liminaires de'" la O"ue-rre a.e sept ans· 1 6 (Paris: Firmin-Didot, 189 , pp.152-153 • 
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capital. However, France had broken diplomatic relations with 
Russia in 17L~8 and as a result the government lacked concise 
information on St. Petersburg's policies. 27 The Foreign 
Ministry's ignorance of Russ.ian affairs, added a new dimension 
to the King's Secret. 
c·onti and his agents in the Secret had been gathering 
·information on Eastern Europe for almost ten years. Louis XJ/, 
therefore, asked Conti to designate an agent to undert~lke a 
fact finding mission to Russia. Conti selected an exiled Scot 
adventurer, Chevalier Douglas,to go to Russia. Lou1s XJ/ then 
secured the Foreign M·inistry's approval for a secret ·mission 
to Russia. The king requested the appointment of Douglas as 
the ministry's agent. Douglas was, thus, a dual agent. He 
served the Foreign Ministry; he also worked for the Ki.ng' s Se-
cret without the ministry's knowledge. 28 This agent left Paris 
in June, 1755 on a mission which would further complicate 
France's Polish policy. 
In Russia, Douglas discovered that the St. Petersburg. 
government was divided into two 
,.l led· one party 1'vhich fa .. vored the 
parti~~~,\Chancellor Bestuzhev 
- ) 
. 
existing Russian ties with Au-
stria and the new link with Britain. Vice Chancellor Voronstov 
--
--- wa-s----oppos e d-~--to--th is system----o~ a-1-1-iano-es--a.p.d stood ___ ready wit-h a -
27Lawrence Jay 011va 9 Misalliance; A Study of ~rerlch 
Foreign Policy in Russia Durin,g the Seven Years 0 vJar(New 
Yorks New York University Press 9 1964) 9 PPo 11~12o France had broken relations with Russia in retaliation for Sto Peters-
burg9 s role in the War of the Austrian Suc6-ession. In that war, 
Russian troops had fought in the pay of Britain against France. 
28Ibid., pp. 12-lJ. 
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. , 'i 
number of adherents to support a French alliance. The Em-
press Elizabeth stood between these two parties and was open , 
'to the influence of both. Thus, the initial reports of Douglas 
encouraged France to further explore the possibilities of a 
Russian alliance, despite the new Anglo-Russian Treaty.29 
Diplomatic complications soon arose because cr:onti ne-
glected to inform any of the King's Secret agents of Douglas' 
mission. : The c·omte de Broglie observed developments. in Russia ,~·1-,.· 
and he, too, recog".rtized that an alliance between St. Petersburg 
< 
and London would threaten Poland. Thus, Broglie dispatched his 
own agent-to Russia in December, 1755 in order to discover the 
state of Anglo-Russian relat1ons·., Broglie I s agent oreE+ted a 
minor international incident when Russian authorities arrested . 
. 
him at Riga. i'he inefficient direction of foreign policy re-
. presented ·by the incident characterized Louis x:-;·•s government;O 
·~\i· 
C-0nti also neglected to inform his agents of another faot. 
Broglie's mission to Polanq.J,was based on the assumption that 
Russia and the pro-Russian Czartoryski :p~rty were enemies of 
Conti~s-,pretentions to the throne. Conti, however, was no 
... 31 
special friend· of Poland. If, as Douglas reported, there· 
was a possi b111 ty of improved· relations •With Russia·. perhaps 
--·----Conti---m-igh.t--bene-fi--t--mere r-rom~-rr~ienas- in· St. Petersburg than 
. _, .. .,~ ... 
in Warsaw. Russia usually named the Duke of Courland and this 
'ii 
!,2 
29Ibide, PPo 14-·22. 
JOibid. , P• 2J. 
J1Ibid., pp. 26-27. 
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position was open in 175S. Furthermore, it was not unrealistio 
to believe that Russia might again name the King of Poland as 
in 1733. Conti must also have considered the fact tl1at Empress 
Elizabeth was unmarried and that she might be willing to wed a 
"' member of the C·onde family. The right connections in Russia 
might give Conti a chance for one or more thronesa Courland, 
,j 
Poland or even Russia itself. These Russian-plans contradicted 
B?'oglie 1 s efforts in Pole .. nd but Conti instructed Dougla_s to work 
toward improved relations in St. Petersburg.32 
Therefore, France pursued its Eastern European diplomacy 
along several courses by 1755. The King's Secret worked in 
Poland to resist Russia and construct a French party to assure 
Conti's election to the throne. In St. Petersburg, the agent 
of the King's Secret aimed at a rapprochement with Russia. 
French official diplomacy desired as little involvement in Po-
land ~s possible and had not diplomatically recogni;ed Russia 
since 1748. 33 Such was the conduct of foreign policy under 
Louis xv·• s administration. Only the Comte de Broglie seems to 
have re·alized how French interests in Poland would be served 
best. 
r Broglie evolved a plan, sometime in 1754 or 17.55, to win 
____ --over .8aXO-ny from ~tish---treaty, rmi-t~-t-hat stata __ fil_tn___:eo_-_ · <"- . --
1 and by stronger bonds and strengthen the unified state. This 
32 · · Ibidoj p. 27 • 
· ·· 33Waddington, · Louis XV et. le renversement des· alliances, . 
p. 509. 
,J·~~ 
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40 
.. combination would then be linked to SWeden and Turkey for a·- · i 
revitalized, updated version of the classic system of French 
alliances. Broglie hoped that his new plan would creat a bloc 
., . 
strong enough to keep a rein on Austria and Russia and assure 
the continued existence of an independent Poland. ~ Rouille, 
who had replaced Saint-Contest as foreign minister, reacted 
favorably to the idea. An expanded war with Britain was im-
minent and this fact encouraged the minister to revi-se his 
foreign policy. A treaty with Saxony would deprive Britain.-.of' 
at l~st one ally in the impending struggle. c-onti, on the other 
- hand, failed to see that Broglie I s plan was in France's best in-
\ 
terests since.it would strengthen the Polish r~public and ally 
it with Louis X.V. In time of war, only a strong Poland could 
.. 
prevent Russian troops from attacking France's allr, Prussia. 
Conti, however, only saw that closer 
Poland would endanger his chances of 
ties between Saxony and 
gaining the Polish throne.J4 
. . . .,.,_ .,. . ~-
. . ' ' 
.......... , .. 
Faced with conf~icting directives from his,two masters, 
Broglie returned to France early in 1755 in an attempt to re-
·--; .. 
ooncile the differences between the secret and official dip1o~ 
-~ ... 
macies.35 The count won Rouill~ over to his plan for a Franco-
Sa..~on subsidy treaty which would reasse·rt French influence in 
. . ~~ . . 
.. ..... 
.. ·-·--------·-·-··-·-~::------. ::.::::::·=:::::::.::.=:----·-··-·---· - ·-·-··--··-- -···· -· ····-··· . jft. .. - ' .- .. . ... '.. -- ... . ... , -.. . '.. - ... 
~---·····--·-~-- Broglie~ The King 9 s Secret 9 Volo Io 9 pp. 87--900 Se-e---a-~~~--
on Broglie 0 s plans 9 Albert Sorel 9 Essais d 8hist~~~e e::;:1tigue (Parisg Didier, 1894) 9 PPo 171=172 and Wladyslaw Konopczynski, 
11Le .. du .. exieme mission du Comte de Broglie; Un sup1Jlement aux , 'In-
str~tc tions de Pologn.e O 175 5-17 56 n, Revue ~ 0 his to ire -~9:iplomt:ttique, 
Ab.nee 21 (1907), pp. 495-496.· ' 
~· - ' 
35comte de Broglie to Prince de Conti, Dresden, January 8, 
1755; in Broglie, The King's Secret,. Vol. I, p. 92. 
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41 
Eastern Europe. Conti, however, was unconvinced of the need 
for the treaty. n·espi te Conti' s opposition, the Foreign Min-
/.,...., istry drafted a treaty with Augustus !II. This pact called for 
Augustus, as Elector of Saxony, to .supply 6,000 men to aid 
France and to pledge his vote in the next imperial election to 
the French candidate. As king of Poland, Augustus was required 
to prevent the passage of Russian troops through Poland. In 
· 36 return for these services France was to p~y 2,000,000 livres. 
Broglie returned to Poland determined to put his plan into ef-
fect. 
·This alliance, however, was neve_r concluded. On January 27, 
1756, before Broglie was able to gain Saxon consent for his treaty, 
Frederick II of Prussia announced the conclusion of the Convention 
of Westmini·ster with B~i.tain. This action precipitated the :Sip-
\,,,. --=-_._. lomatic Revolution. Britain I s alliance 'tfi th Austria's great 
enemy ended the historic coalition between the Hapsburgs and 
the maritime states. France found herself without important al-
lies because of Frederick's defection and, therefore, made peace 
with her old Hapsburg enemy. Russia was enraged by Britain's 
violation of the secret c~ause of the Treaty of St. Petersburg 
' ' 
providing- for joint consultation on Prussia. St. Petersburg 
): ·terminated 1-ts ·B-ritish alliance and_ fell back on its Austrian------:--_ --------t 
1'. 
'.( ~-----·---..c··-- - -
----- - } 
~1 
f 
----------~ 
treaties • .J' Hence, France.and Russia found themselves on the 
S6tme side in a -new alliance system. Bbth states had alliances 
36 6 ·Ibido, p. 9. 
37waddington, Louis XV et le renVersement des alliances, p. 223. 
. 
t. 
... 
~· '-
.. 
with.Austria and the three powers drew .closer together as the 
'' . 
Seven Years' War erupted in the summer of 1756. · 
The revolution in alliances destroyed Broglie's plans in 
-
J ' 
Poland. The alliance betw~en France and Russia discredited the 
pro-French group in Poland because the party's benefactor had 
allied itself w1 th Russia, the l)arty' s greatest f'oreign enemy. 
If war broke out, France· was obliged to consent to the passage 
. 
·-... 
of Russian troops through Poland to r~a~~ .. .-Frussia. The presence 
'~ 
of the czarina's armies would mean increased influence for her 
party in.the repub(ic.38 
'--
\ 
French policy in Poland in the years 1752-1756 failed to 
serve the kin.gdom•s best intersts. Louis XV's representative 
engaged -in partisan activities which contributed to division of 
the republic. 
~r, 
B-~oglie allied France with the reactionary Po-
tocki\ party which opposed reforms so necessary to Poland's 
life.39 The alliance drove the Czartoryski to closer ties 
with Russia. When Broglie finally realized the need to unite 
. ' 
and strengthen Poland, France had lost the opportunity to effect 
reforms in the republic. After 1756, the nation's Russian al-
liance forced France to give official consent to the_ passage of 
Russian troops through Poland to engage Prussian forces. The 
. .
3~Lo:rd,~-'I',h-e~---Se0ond Petrti tion _ of Poland, pp. J7-J8 .•.. -,------·· -- ~~~--
39There were other indications that France was backing the . · 
wrong horse in th.e re .. c)§o The 1755 Tres.,ty of Sto Petersburg had 
required that. Russia, move troops to -ne1~ positions on her borders. 
In moving these troor.,s 9 Ru .. ssian' comms .. nders took the shortest 
route 9 across Polish territory o The -Great GenerB.,l Branicki and 
the Potocki~ hoi1ever 9 cou ..la ... not rally sufficient sup·port to op-
pose the movement e"v-en th.ough Fra,nce offered to ~ine ..ncially u .. n-
deriv-ri te ·the opposition to the Rus·sians. See Reddaway, c·a .. mbridge 
History of Poland, p. 38. -.... ~ .. 
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presence o~ Russian troops in the republic meant that France 
lost much of its voice in Polish affa .. irs, and paved the 1qay 
for the hegemony of states basically unfriendly. to Poland • 
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CHAPTER III 
1 •. 
FRENCH. POLICY DURING THE SEVEN YEARS' WAB, .1756-1 762 
Frederick the·Great•s August, 1756 "preventive" attack 
on Austria through .Saxony precipi ta.ted the Seven Years• war 
and initiated a second phase in the French diplomatic defeat 
in Poland. 1 French foreign policy was unprepared to deal 
with the events unleashed by Frederick's sudden attack. The 
" Diplomatic Revolution which preceded the war had resulted in 
a general confusion in French diplomacy, secret and offioial. 2 
Therefore, the Comte de Broglie found himself without in-
structions as to the role of the Kin~'s Secret in the new .._, 
diplomatic order when Prussia invaded.Saxony. When the count 
• I 
.,, . 
' finally received instructions they were a study in contra~ 
dictory terms. Conti wrote: 
I)" 
/ 
The king feels all the difficulty and embarrass-
ment that woulq. arise in case the Empresses ( Ma,,ria The-
resa and Elizs ..beth) should contemplate the violati.on of 
the territory of Pole .. ndQ He feels on. the one h.FJ.r1d. 9 that 
these new ties restr4ct that protection which he might 
accord_ to- the Republic; on the other~ tha·t to 1'\Ti thd_raw his 
1
on the opening of the Seven Year~' W8JI' see Herbert But----
--~---~t---erfiel-d .. , · -The- -Ree-e11stFucti0n of an Historical Eoisodeg The 
. ' 
H 1st o ry qf th e ____ Ell_ 11-i_r ____ int_o __ th_e __ ~_Qri g_i.n.s ___ of ___ tt1-e--S-ev-e11-----:Y:ee.,-r-s- ' 
War C:,.lasgow: Vol. 91 of GlElSgow University Publicati ens, 1951). 
'2Broglie, The King's Secret, Vol. I, pp. 133-137. 
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Protection the same moti~es of justice subsisting, · 
would be to injure his credit and influence in Poland 
and Turkey; ooo His Majesty charges me to inform you that you are not to change your tone in Poland 9 but 
must conti1'1ue to assert that tiis Majesty will al1tlays 
accord his~protection to the liberties of the Republic, 
as well as~by the good offic~s which his new relations 
will enable him to employ ••• J 
In the light of the new French alliances with Austria and 
Russia, ~he defense of Polish liberties called for by these 
instructions proved difficult to reconcile with official 
foreign policy. Broglie was, of course, cognizant of a po-
tential Russian threat to Poland. The count was in Dresden 
when Frederick invaded Saxony on August 30, 1756. He re-
cognized that Russia would react ·to the Prussian attack by 
moving troops across Poland to engage Prussia and thus honor 
St. Petersburg's defensive commitment to Austria. The count 
immed~_ately took steps to reassure the French party in Poland. . 
Broglie instructed M. Durand, the French dip],,omaticcesldent 
_in Warsaw to.inform Branicki and his party that Louis XY 
would stand by Poland in the event of Russian violation ·or 
the republic's borders. 4 
The count endeavor·ed in other ways to protect Poland. On. 
September 11th, 1756, Broglie wrote to Chevalier Douglas, the 
. . ~ '·,. French charge d'affaires in St. Petersburg, seeking protection 
-- --- ~---
----· -----~------ --------------
of Polish interests o, The count fir.st, sought to restrict 
\ . 
' 
3Prince de Conti to Cbmte de Broglie, August 9, 1756; in 
,ibid., pp. 138-139. 
4comt~ de Broglie to M. Durand, Dresden, September 11, .,.~ · 1756; in ibid., p. 152. 
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the Russians to an amphibious expedition which would avoid 
Polish t~rritory. He asked •could we not confine the Russian 
.. ~ : .... , 
expedition to a disembarkation in Pomerania?" If Douglas could 
not limit Russia to a seaborn expedition, Broglie urged that 
/ the charge d~affaires procure Empress Elizabeth's agreement 
to limit her troops' line of march to a corner of Lithuania.5 
The Foreign Ministry also awoke to the Russian threat to 
Poland. A letter of September 23, 1756 from Foreign Minister 
'c-Ro u i 11 ~ to Douglas urged that Russia be compelled to seek Po-, 
lish consent for any expedition crossing the republic's ter-
r 
· ri:t;ory. ;' Rouille, too, pref err·ed that Russia descend on Prussia 
with an amphibious expedition embarking from Livonia and landing " 
at Danzig. 6 
Russia, unfortunately, recognized that French involvement 
7 
in the west' left Louis X!l' s gov_ernment with resources inadequate . 
to deep involvement in Eastern Europe. St. Petersburg declared 
its intention to march across Poland and left the door open for 
provocative •incidents" when it replied to Versailles: 
Although .the idea of Broglie, that our troops in their march touch Poland as little as possible is agreed to 
-in principle here o.,., it is nevertheless ab:solute.ly impossibleo You may give Broglie the strongest as-surances that we will not abuse the necessity of our passage in any 'if'.ray... Of cou ..rse, · we know that tt1e most badly intentloned among the Poles·.~. will take this - --~---.-------- ------~~--- march as a·tavorable occasion to sow complaints and division between our ·two courtso7 
5comte de Broglie to Chevalier Douglas, Dresden, Septem-ber 11, 1756; in ibid., p. 152. 
601iva, Polish Review, p. 67. 
?Ibid., p. 68. 
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. . , Faoed w1 th a positive stand by St. Petersburg, Rouille 
acoeded to Russian plans to move across Poland. The Secret, 
~----~however, did not cease 1-ts oppo~i tion to the Russian march. 
\ Great General Branicki, the head of the French party in Po-· 
land, sent an envoy "to notify Constantinople of Russian plans. 
It was hoped that the Ottoman Empire would exert mil1 tar·y or 
diplomatic pressure on Sto Petersburg to restric the march 
of Russian tro~ps. Durand also sought the Porte's pressure 
[~ on Russia in his correspondence with Vergennes, French ambas-
sador in Constantinople and member of the Secret.a 
,_ 
. As the fall of 1756 waned, th.-~ proposed Russian,.expedition 
~ was postponed until the spring of 1757. However, during the 
autumn months ohanges occurred in the Secret and in Poland. 
' The King's s·ecret correspondence took on a much more viru-
lent anti-Russian tone. Angered at being by-passed for an 
army command, the Prince of Conti resigned as director of the 
Seoret:;9 Henceforth, the Secret w~ directed by Tercier at 
the Foreign Ministry and Broglie in Pola~ Broglie's ele-
vation to the Secret' s directorship brought~ strong foe of. 
Russia to an influential position in the se·cret diplomacy. 
r Broglie wrote: 
• ~· ; • r 
It is still more imnortant to restrain Muscovite ... 
- ,, . . .. , ...... ~ .... . ,, --~ 
I :: power 11i th in the narro~res t~p~o~s~s~i~b_l~~e__±l~i!!]m~i~t~sL..,~~L-~---~~,-----r L-~--..,--,--,---:-----,-----:-_ weul-ti--be-d~nge-rou-s--to accustom it to too much in-fluence in European affairs, and to let the Court 
8Ibid. ,_ 
9~ouis XV to Teroier, Fotttainbleau, November-9, 1756, in :S--outaric, Correspondence secrete, Jol. I., pp. 212-213, 
J 
.. 
....... "'-.. 
. . ' 
- .. 
---
. 
.-~·-: 
.. . . .JI:'" 
., 
. - ·-·-·-----··--·---·-· - - . 
_i, 1 _, .... - ' 
. '·::'.;~ ., ·-
48 ' ' :·,·; -: .. -· 
., 
,- -·--. -.•- ·-- .. ,---·-· - ----~~- . ' . : ' : 
' of St. Petersbuf~ b~ a.ware of the f;ull extent of its strength ••• 
• 1 
Meanl'1hile, in Poland, August~s III 1noved diploma .. tioally 
\ 
closer to .st. Petersburg. Frederick II's invasion of Saxony 
meant Prussian control of that state, the inclusion of Dres-
den's forces into t·he Prussian ·a:mny, and the exile of Au-
gustus III to Poland. Frederick II's victory over Saxony 
prompted Count Bruhl to strengthen ties of the exiled Saxon 
.. 
court with Russia. Accordingly, Stanislas Poniatowski, a 
member of the pro-Russian Cze .. rtoryski family, was sent as 
Saxon ambassador· to St. Petersburg in the fall of 1756. Bruhl 
instructed Poniatowski to bring Russian troops against Prussia 
as soon as possible, even if this meant the transit of Empress 
Elizabeth's army across Poland. As usual, Bruhl subordinated 
Poland's interests to thos~eof Saxony. 11 
The invasion of Saxony resulted in the Comte de Broglie's 
return to France for .,t.urther instructiohs in November, 1756. 
Broglie was awarded the cordon bleu on his return but his 
views on Poland were not those of the government. Abbe de 
·.l~ ........ ,, 
- .,e:;~.' 
Bernis and others. who favored the new Russian and Aust"ian 
alliances controlled the official foreign policy and were 
-loath to anger St. Petersburg by pressing the Polish issue. 
\.. 
---·---------------
------------- -
Comte de Broglie to Comte a. o Es trees tFrench ambassador to ·vienna] 9 Pragu.e,,i t,Jovember 26$7 1756; reprinted in Broglie, The King 0 s Se<Yret, Volo I, PPe 187-190. 
11Reddar,,ra;f\ Cam.bridg9 History of Poland, p. 39. Fred-erick II aJ··so noticed Saxon overtures to Russia. Frederick II, The Hist,ory of the Seven Yes .. rs 0 tiar, Part I, tra ..ns. by Thomas Holcroft (London: Robinson, 1789), pp. 304-3.05. w-
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Broglie recognized this fact and attempted to resign.from 
the Warsaw embassay. The count sought the ambassadorial 
" ~ post at Vienna or any army command. 12 Louis ·xv was aware 
that Broglie's views were incompatible with the new all-
iance system but the king ordered the count back to Poland 
.. 
with. instructions to protect the !epublio interesf,~ as well 
' 
as to observe the spirit of Franoe 0s new alliances. Louis 
stated that Broglie was the only man qualified for the War-
. 
· 13 saw.:post0 Thus, the ambassador-agent returned to Poland 
l 
with contradictory instructions from his monarch. Poland 
could not be maintained if France permitted the entry of 
Russian t~oops. 
,. Rouille 1s official instructions to Broglie showed the 
influence of Bemis. ~ The abbe exercised considerable power 
at .the Foreign Ministry but lacked an offic1a1 position. 
The Foreign·Ministry•s instructions advised'Broglie to as-
sume a oonc111atory attitude toward the Pol:t:sh government 
and especially Count Bruhl ., The French· ambassado+ never 
enjoyed amiable relations with Briihl but that minister's new 
pro-Bissian orientation further aggravated the poor relations 
existing between the two men. These instructions also dealt 
12 · · ..... · .. · - · -
. Broglie 9 The Kine; 0s ~eoretg Vol. I, pp. 195-204. 
l)Louis XV to Comte de Broglie, Versailles, December 24, ·. 1756 and J~nuary 22, 1757; in Boutaric, Correspondano·e secr~te, Vol. I, pp. 214-216. 
-~-
:: • ·11 
·1'' 
.'..;._ ',• 
I 
. I 
·.~· 
'.i 
' . 
; ' i': 
. ' 
; i 
1-. ~ 
i : 
I 
; I 
.- I 
' I 
, I 
•• I ~ I 
: I 
!!.I ,,_l -.Jl!lllllllll!-------------...... -----lllllllllm--......... -----~---..ii--...-lllllll!a.....,~ ............. ~~~---. 
j•·'.• 
' •. I 
•• t; 
,' 
so .. ;t >. 
,, .. ·-. ~ 
with the movement ot Russ\tan troops ,into,,1i1.Poland. ,The mini-
stry stated that, if Poland was genuinely threatened by Rus-
~ . 0 
sia, Versailles t1ould aot in the republic 0 s defense. Howe1ter, -. 
". 
since the expected 1757 passage of Russian troops through Po-
. .. 
land was solely: to combat that •ambitious prince•, Frederick II, 
the ambassador should not hinder this march. Indeed an oppo-
site course of action was ordered: 
The Comte de Broglie ought, therefore, to make use 
of all his talents and all his wisdom in order to 
make -this passage acceptable to the Poles, or at 
least to make it tfkerable, without opposition and 
without complaint. 
1 
The official diplomacy of France still differed from 
. ~ 
,,.:i· 
the K1ng 0s Secret diplomacy bt 1757. Bl'oglie encountered 
increasing difficulty in satisfying his two masters but this 
was not the only problem oonfron.ting the King's Secret. Con-
ti's ex1 t from the ~eoret left Louis XV' s ·clandestine foreign 
t 
policy w1 thout a def1ni te goal. The Sebret' s original pur-
pose was to elect a Frenchman to the Polish throne but with 
a:ont1 's resignation -the organ.ization was forced to find a new 
"'· 
candidate for the crown. Louis X.V exhibited his customary in~ 
several princes, including Prince Xavier of Saxony 9 but was 
unable to make a decision. In response to Broglie's urgent 
---------
--,, n 
letters from. tlarsaw, the ki~~ also proved incapable of re- · 
· 
1;Inst:ruct1ons du ro,i au sieur Comte de Brog11e~_i!_avr11, 
1757•, in Re·cueil ••• Pologne, .PP• 191-195. 
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conci11ng his otticial and secret Polish pol1c1~s~ 15 
' J 
' 
·,t this juricture, ·1n ?une, 175·7, Abb~ Bemis replaced 
- - - - --- ___ _.__ --- -- ---~ -·-, 
. I . 
-Bou1lle at the Foreign M.inistry. The Abbe had negotiated the 
Austrian treaty and favored France's new system of alliances. 
As one of his first acts, the new minister appointed the Mar-
quis d~ 1°H&pi.tal as ambassador to St. Petersburg. H&pital 
I viewed the new alliance system as optimistically as Bemis. 
He replaced the Chevalier Dougla.s, a member of the~1e1ng's Se-
cret, at St. Petersburg. Therefore, both the foreign minister 
as well as the French ambassador in Sto Petersburg were unsym-
pathetic to the Secret•s anti-Russian stance. 16 
In the spring\;f of.;,,1757, Russian troops·:'· entered Poland and 
helped themselves to the resources of the republic. 17 The 
Cbmte de Broglie, as France's ambassador, found himself flooded 
with Polish appeals tor assistance against the Russians. 18 ' Bro-
glie brought the Poles' complaints to the attention of Louis 
---
and,wrote of the danger that the Russians presented to Poland: 
The danger is that Russia may use,the pretext of the 
. warvo o o to .move in f oree on Polish terr1 tory o " o e In permitting them to do th1SeaoWe would free this Vast 
·; 
. 
' \ 1
.5Brogl1e, The King 0 s Sec:ic'etg Volo !p PPo 207=2080 Al.so, ·,c\. Comte de Broglie to Loui~ XV'g V®rsaillesS) J~uary 2SJ 1757; in 1. Didier Ozans.m 'and ji{[ichel .. Mtoi·ne (eds() ) ~ Correspondenc® se\1111 t \c cre.te du Comte de Bro lie avec Louis ·-xv, Tome!: 1756-1766 Paris: Co Klinoksieck, 195 , pp. 5-. 16 · . . 
. Oliva, Polish Review, pp. 70-71. 
-1-:. 
· 
1
~~ogl1e, The K1ng 0 s _Seere~, pp. 224-225. 18 '''>· -
·· Reddaway·, Cambrid~e Histor1 of Poland, p. 39 • 
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country to the Russian generals, to the despotism 
of the Russian court, and to all the future pro-
jects of -·usurpation to which they would be tempted ••• 19 
Broglie's suggestions that France take a more active role 
_ on Poland Os behalf were disregarded. C.onfronted by m111 tary 
defeats such as Rossbach (November 5, 1757), Bern1s did not 
,,. 
wish to endanger the Russian alliance by protesting his a1-
. · 20 
ly 1 s actions in Plando Broglie's protests soon came under 
attack. Russia complained of the hostile attitude of France's 
·ambassador at Warsaw and Bemis grew increasingly critical of 
,_ 
'<I 4 ·, 
., 
J 
· ·-·---~-~---.._ B-=roglie es actions in Poland. 21 Despite these complaints, the 
'It..,, . 
p 
. , --
I " ·,~ 
·t 
count continued to present a sympathetic ear to all Polish 
complaints of Russian abuses· and transmitted these claims to 
·22 Versaillese 
In ·answer to his critics, Broglie accused Bemis of aban-
doning Poland. 23 The count also wrote to Louis XV pointing 
out that he was only following the king's orders conveyed 
through the Secret. 24 Broglie also attempted to coal the re-
lationship between Augustus III 0 s court and Sto Petersburg • 
· l9Mem.oir on French :foreign policy by the Comte de Broglie, 
September$) 17.57; in Boutaric, Correspondan.ce secrete, Vol. I, 
PP• 11=12o 
"', 
., 
20 Goo_cn, Louis XV, pp. 173-180. se·e also, Oliva, Po11sh 
Review~ P• 72. 
21 · Broglie, The King's Secret, Vol. I, pp. 235-2)7. Also, 
Oliva, Polish Rev 8W9 Po • 
· 
2?:sroglie~ The King 0 s Secret, pp. 225,-227. 
·, 
23com.te d® Broglie to Louis XV9 W~saw9 March 25, 17S7; in 
Ozanam and .AJatoin<e g _ Correspondence s~c~et~ 9 PPo. JB-40. 
24comte de Broglie t~ Louis XV, Warsaw,Dec. 2, 1757, ibid., . · 
pp. 4)-44. 
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He sought the recall of Poniatpwski, the lover of Grand 
Duchess Catherine/' from the Saxon embassy in Russia. 25 Al-
though Broglie ef~ected Poniatowsk1 1s recall, this victory 
I 
proved to be his last success in Poland. 
Broglie's protests and.appeals to his k1ng.w~nt unan-
swered for a 1ong time. Finally the weak monarch answered 
hl~ am9assador=agent but all he could recommend was patience. 
• '.!. 
1··'"'· 
Louis X.V offered no solution of Broglie's dilemma, the neces-
sity to serve both the Foreign Ministry and the Secret. 26 Bro-
glie's problems at Warsaw ended on February 1 9 17580 On that 
day the count was recalled from Poland by Bernis. ·27 His re-
call did not mean the end or the Secret•s interest in Poland. 
It meant rather that the King's Secret would be much less im-
portant in F.astern Europe. 
.. I .. 
'-
;;·.· 
. . -·-··-·-·---------- -----------·--- -- -- T:· 
Broglie's recall from Warsaw crippled the French party 
in Poland. M. Durand was lett in charge of French affairs in 
the republic and Broglie asked the resident to do everything 
possible to encourage the French party in Polando 28unfor-
tunately, the king lacked the resources to maintain the party._ 
. , 
2SBrogli®9 .Xhe )[in~ 0 s S®er~t.ll Volo !g PPo 243=245 • 
26 n YU . . g_ 58 
_ Lou1~ JN to ~omte d~ Brogli~~ March 2J 9 17 , inpBou-
taric, Cor:rrers:eondance. Sl®©r~t@. 0 PPo 228=2290 · 
2 7r,cm.1~ ff to c6mte d® BI"ogli@ g Versailles, May 21, 17S8, 
in 1b1do g PPo 229=2)09 Oliwa-9 Poli~h Review, p. 73 and Broglie, 
The King0 s S@creit,9 Volo lg Po ~o · · · · 
28 g · Comte d® Broglie t.o Mo Durand, Warsaw, March 27, 1758; 
in Broglie, The Kinggs Secret, Vol. I, pp. 256-,25?. 
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Prench defeats in Western Europe and overseas indicated little 
hope for future subsidies to France's Polish friends. The key 
members of the Secret, Durand, Tercier and ,:'Broglie became dis-
eouraged as French interests in Poland seemed abandoned by 
Versaill~so 29 
France's inability to support Poland threw t~e republic 
u) 
.. open to its stronger neighbors. Russia maintained J0,000 
troops 1n Poland in 1758. These troops seized whole towns for 
their use during the campaign leading to the Russian victory 
over Frederick at Kunersdor:f. The following year, Frederick's 
troops entered Poland to combat.the Russians. The Russian and 
Prussian operations turned the republic into a battlefield and 
affected Poland in two other ways. First, Bl'iihl recognized 
· Russian ascendancy in Poland and drew even further ·into St. 
1.,t. 
Petersburg• s .. orbit. Secondly, the, uncontested incursion of 
foreign troops disgraced the Polish a,nny. ·The republic's forces 
were und®r the command of the Francophile Braniok1 and the in-
vasions redounded to the discredit of the French party which 
he led.JO 
) 
Boland confronted another problem during the war years • 
. . 
' ,, +., 
-""-·· .'·'., .... h 
·1. . J"' 
, .. ~ 
i 
The ·be.leagured republic was struck by economic disaster. Pre- ---~--·~=-.-----------· ---·-
deriok II began a systematic debasemen\ of the currencies of 
' .. 
) Eastern Europe. The Prussian monarch was in desperate need of ·-
..,._ 
• p 
......... 
29com.te de Broglie to Louil!l,l XV 9 V®rsaillesg July '.31 9 17.58; in O~ana.m and &n.toin®- 9 ~orr@s:eondanc® Sjec~t~ ~ PPo 79<1a82. 
· ' , 
30Freder1~k II 9 . ~@ven Y®ar~ 0 W~ 1, Part IIP pp .. 21-22. Also, BeddawayS) '2.ambridge -;Hi:.$1tory of Poland, pp. J9-40, and· 
Oliva, .. Misalliance, pp. 10.5.;·107. 
ft HM+W&·!ffl e e 
J 
•• 
ss 
cash to carry on his war. '!tlus, the king's agents siphoned 
sound coinage of neighboring states into Prussia. This coin-
-·.t: 
. 
~ age was melted down and Frederick kept the gold derived from 
. s 
this process. The Prussian monarch then issued counterfeit 
coins in the currencies of Poland, Saxony, Bohemia, Russia. 
' 
' and Hungarye The agency for this operation was the Saxon 
mint at Dresden which Frederick had controlled since his 
1756 1nvast1on. While this measure provided Prussia with 
needed gold, it proved economically disastrous to Poland atid 
. Jl other states. 
p 
Wh11• Poland suffered such wartime problems, French in-
fluence in the republic continued to dec11ne. Bemis was re-
,vlaoed as foreign minister by the Duo de Chm1seul in December, 
1758. The new minister accelerated the abandonment of Poland 
' ' by France's official diplomacy~ Choiseul's attitude toward 
Poland was dictated by the many problems ~acing France. The 
? nation had suffered numerous defeats since entering the Seven ' ',.. .. - ~. 
Years• War, and it was on the verge of bankruptcy. Cho1seul, 
therefore, adopted certain priorities for French foreign policy. 
;,ti . He eledted to concentrate the· nation's energies on the conflict I' 
. --- ··- .. --· 
- --· -with Britain and an integral part of ~such a policy was re:brench-_.t.., 
#9" 
ment of French commitm~nts in Eastern _Europe.32 
J1 
J Walter La Do1~n 0 Th® er m eti tion for Em ire (New Yorks Harper & :Brothe~~,_19 0 9 Po J3 · o . 
.. 
32Gooch 9 tmii~ :I.VP PPo i80=i91o On ~l'tloiseul's foreign p·ol1cy see also Joh:mFra~i@r. R~sey 9 &ngltl Fr~nch Relations, 1 6 c::,1 O Ii Stud of Chois@ul Os Fox>ei · Polio .. ,· (Be.rkelys University of California Press, 1939 , · 1 5-14?. 
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Choiseul instructed Paul>lll7,:·· the newly appointed French 
ambassador· to Poland, to follow a new policy1 
In regard to this kingdom, we followe4 in the past a plan which was very costly to France and which was based on nothing else but the precedent of an old practi@®o ~® d~alt with th® kingdom of Poland es we dealt t~ith po~i~rs ?Yhich have a regular government and 
which @an b® feared or expected to have some influence 1n th! )QOlit_ioal life of Europe. This is an obvious erroro·)j ' 
Thus, Cho1seul 1s instructions severely curtailed French in-. 
. 
volvement in Pola.nd.34 He further damaged French influence, 
~ J .. 
perhaps unwittinglyG The foreign minister removed Tercier from 
the post of premier, commis on Fe.bruary 27, 17S9-. The ostensible 
,q 
reason for Teroier Os r~moval was the tact that the· premier 
oommis, who suppl®ment~~ his income by serving as a censor, 
had passed Helvetius• Jle 1°®sprito This work angered certain· = . > 
:factions at Versailles, wa~ c~nsu.red by the Sorbonne and later 
suppressed, It seems that Ch.oiseul 0s real motivation was to 
terminate the secret activities in which he suspected Tercier 
was engaged. 35 Louis XV·, of course, did nothing to save his . . . . . . ... . . . . . . 
. . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . 
r ' , 
- ,,.. .. 
. ,. 
J)c;iM®moi1: pour !ll®l"Vir d O 1nstructio:i.ui au ~i®Wi:' Narquis de PaulmYooog a1lant a Var$GWi® ~n qualit' d 0am.ba~sadeur de Sa Majest, pres le 1~01 .. d® la Bepubl1que de Pologne•, · Versailles, 
April 7 9 1760~ in R@~ueiloooPologne, p. 211. ----------~---·-------------------------------
L-. 
------- ·- ------······---------------- - .. 34 . . > 
Ibidog PPo 217~219e 
,_?SAU.though ilm®o du Hausset, Mme. Pompadour's lady-in-
wa1~~i\g a.sssrted that '2.ho1seul discovered the King's Secret, 
ev1denc~ @onclusiv®ly proving this fact is unavailableo Lou1s-XV· eusu~urced :Srogli~ that th® ~ec~e"t wa~ nerwer· knoitn,i to CJhoiseul. · See tv1.m®o du Etaussetg .w~moir~ C(,-i\:o?.ri~o Pom a.dour b h.®r 'trYtmitin Woman {Londong G.o Routledgeg 9281 ~ PPo 2- rn))o ilso 9 LouiSJ XV to Comte d® B~ogl:1~-9 Ve1-osail esg rv:1aro ) 9 1759; in Houtaricp Cor-
respond.ancei secrete? VolQ !9 PPe 237-2.38. Also, Broglie, The K1ng 0s Secret, Vol. I~·, pp. 289-291. 
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secret agent. 
() 
\..> ' 
With Tero1er•s dismissal, the last link between France's 
.official foreign policy and the King's Secret was severed • 
.. ,. 
Henc®forth, the S®c~et would play a less important role in 
Poland. Broglie and Terc1er remained in P.-r~nce, continued as •. h 
directors of the Secret and still received instructions from 
Louis. However, their isolation from the Foreign Ministry 
meant that information on Poland was often received third 
hand, two months after the event. Despite this limitation, 
. )6 Louis u· ordered th~ ~eeret continuedo Among his other 
tailings, the king disliked changes in established procedures. 
Events in Poland reflected Choiseul's further curtailment 
of French activities in the_republic. The fate of Danzig was 
~esolved by Cho1seul's policy. Broglie war.ned of a. Russian 
threat to the city after his recall from PolandJ7 and Rus-
sia excited Poland in the fall of 1758 by preparations to 
occupy Danzig. The intensi~y of the Polish opposition to,-
such a.:·.move caused St. Petersburg to reconsider 1 ts intentions. 
However, when Danzig sought French aid for its defense, Abb' 
Bemis recognized tbat France could not oppose Russia. The 
Russian troops which would occupy Danzig were needed to sµptlll_ . ____ .----. . .. 
port Sweden's forces in Pomerania. 
< ) 
Opposition to Russia might 
' '-· 
slow this aid and result in,<,SWeden•s defection from the anti-
)6m.,ogli® 9 !f)l@ King~ Secret, Vol. I,',....r~. 290-291. 
ft . . Comte de Broglie to Louis D's, Paris$) t\pril 22, 1758; in Ozanam and Antoine, Correspondance secr~te, pp. SB-62. 
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Prussian ooal1t1on.38 
. ·•r . 
. ,.,, :\ 
\ 
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When Choiseul .replaced Bemis at the Foreign 1n1stry, he 
\ 
' \ dec~ared Poland's defense no longer-a matte~ of act~ve concern 
. 
I 
\ 
• I 
for Fra.noeo39 Danzig, Poland's most important port, \was shortlj 
\ 
in Russian hands. \ \ \ 
\ ' The disposition of the Du.chy of Oourland also demonstrated 
\ 
the lack of French prestige 1n Eastern Europe. Although .aour- · 
" land was legally under the suzerainty of the Polish crown, Rus-
sia's strength meant that the duke of that province had been 
~--named· by Sto ·Petersburg sinee-the,1740 1-s. ---~hl-@s---~1p1omat1c, 
\ advances to Russia resulted in the selection of one ot Augustus 
III's sons, Prince c·harles, as Duke of Courland in 1758. Charles• 
. I 
selection reflected further improvement in Saxon~Russian rela-
tions. More s1gn1f1oant that .this is the.fact that F~anoe•s 
prestige was so low -that Versa111-es was -ne-ver· consulted in the 
decision on CourlandQ4o 
* !ranee no 1onger def ended Poland-, Russia's influence in 
the republic was on the rise and was maintained by the contin-
uing presence of the Czar1na 0 s troops. Howev,er, party strife 
-·· -· 
\ 
• 0 
among ~he nobles continued. The Rus~ian threat was unrecognized - .~ 
,-..... . 
·----~ ··---·-- ----- .. . 
---------··-··----------~----- ._ ~------ ------- -- and Poland's anarchy continued. The Czartoryski na tura1ly 
"· 
39 - .. : '' · · Oliva, Misallianoe 9 p. 157. ,r 
" 
40Reddawa;rs, CS!ilb~idg;e History- ~t Poiand, pp. 40-42. Charles was the youngest son of August III. The oldest son 
~was Frederick Christian, his second son was Xavier. 
j'. 
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op.posed the appointment of Prince Charles as Duke ot Courland 
a1nce the selection of the s:a.xon prince strengthened their 
•• enemy, Bruhl 9 and the dynasty he served. Their opposition 
exploded the 1758 Diet. An ext~aord1nary Diet called in the 
spring of 1761 to deal with the effects of Frederick the 
Great 9s counterfeiting activities was ineffective. Th1s Diet 
was exploded in part becasue certain nobles were involved 1n 
the Prussian operation. Indeed, Poland was so divided that 
Augustus III rejected a reform proposal during the war years· 
in order to save the republic from further turmo11 .. 41 
BY 1761, the official po11cy of Prance in Poland was di-
vorced from any concern for the republic's tat~. Choiseul 
sought to use Russia's 11good offices" in s~cret negotiat+ons 
to---disengage France from her disastrous war with England. In 
return, Cho1seul agreed to accept the fait aecompli of Russian 
expansion at Poland's expense. These peace feelers had little 
result since Russia hardly needed French approval for 1ts ac-
-
# ~ ~ ... 
tions. BJ 1761, the Secret,· too, was crippled in Po:J_and. Dll-
~-
rand's recall by Choiseul left Louis XV and Broglie with one 
agent in the republic. ·-This agent was M. Henning t1ho, as sec-
·:~~r:.:-._ 
,,. 
·' 
. . . ..... ---~-.,--.------------·"··--.. ---···~----····~---~·"· retary to the French ambassador, exercised 11t·t1e authority. 
The 1ntroduct1on· into the Secret of Breteuil, French minister 
to Russia, failed to resurrect French ... influence ·1n Poland. 42 
41 · 
· Ibid. 
42 
Oliva, Polish Review, pp. 77--78. 
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Moreover, Lou.is XV', simply lacked the funds to take a more 
active role in Polish affairs. 43 · The Secret correspondence· 
_ between Louis XV, Broglie and Tercier continued -and often 
dwe1t on Poland. 
BJ 1761, then, French cred1 t in Eastern Europe was quite 
-low. This was the situation the following year when the diplo-
matic order was abruptly shaken by several deaths. - On Janu-
ary 5, 1762, Em.press Elizabeth of Russia, died. Her death 
brought Peter III to the throne,. The new czar, who greatly ad-
mired Frederick II, took Russia out of the war and terminated 
St. Petersburg's alliance with Versailles. France had with-
drawn her support of Poland in part. to assure the health o~ the 
nation°s Russian alliance. Russia's defection under her new 
czar left France with little influence in Poland and without 
. 
the •good off1oes0 in St. Pe~ersburg which Louis xv:· wrote so 
-~ .. ; 
optimistically about in 1756. 
Peter III was soon toppled from the throne by his wife, 
-Catherine, and s·hortly after his fall, was ass~s1nated. The 
new ozariha, ~atherine II, would emJ:>a~k on an ambitious Polish 
, policy which was facilitated by yet another royal death, that 
---of Augustus III of Poland on October S, 1763. The king's death 
I 
I 
opened up the question of Polish sucr~sion. In dealing with 
the Polish succession, French diplomacy, secret and official, 
woul.d again be defeated.. This defeat would ult1~tely lead· to_· 
the partition of Prance• s former ally .•. 
4)touis_ XV to Broglie, Versailles, April 5, 1760; in Boutaric, Correspondance secrete, Vol. I, pp. 252-25). 
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CHAPTER IV 
../ 
' FRENCH POLICY, 1762-17641 THE FINAL DEFEAT 
The final debacle for French policy in Poland was the 
election of Stanislas Poniatowski, the Russian candidate, to 
the republic's throne in 1764. An examination of this election 
must begin w1 th a _treatment of Rus_sia • s Polish Policy. France's 
continued involvement in the Seven Years• War and St. Peters-
burg's exit from the hostilities meSllt that Russia had a free t hand in :Eastern Europe until the Treaty of Paris of 1763. 
Upon ascending the throne of Russia in 1762, Peter III 
concluded a treaty with Prussia. Peter III was a Germ.an and 
made no secret of his admiration of Frederick the Great. T.hus, 
his treaty with Frederick has 9een characterized as •more like 
· a declaration of love than one of alliance between two sover-
eigns". 1 fhis agreement of May 5, 1762 not only took Russia 
out of the Seven Years' War but allied her with Prussia and 
restored all Prussian territories occupied. by the czar's troops. 
Peter III was overthrQ
1
wn shortly after the conclusion of this 
treaty, but the pact is- significant. It marked a rapproche~ 
ment · betire®n t110 old enem1e$ ~ Prussia and.' Russia, which -would 
1 Broglie, The King's Secret, Vol. II, p. 9. 
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\ 
not be rejected by Peter III's successor, Catherine II. 
-
Peter's fall in June~ 1763, technically ended his al-
11ance with Frederick. For a time, ~atherine made no-eymoves 
either to renew Russia's· French alliance or to take up Peter's 
Prussian pact. While Catherine·was thus consolidating her rule 
by neutrality, the King's Secret moved to protect Poland. 
Louis XVi' wrote to aron Bt-eteuil, ambassador to Russia and a 
member of the Secret thats 
You are already aware, and I will repeat it to you again d1stinctly 0 that the only object of my policy with Russia is to keep her as much a~ ·possibl® ··apart trom Europ~an affairlo Without your~@lf ~oing any-thing9 or a@ting in any w~y that might giw® h®~ grow.ads of complaint again~t u~ 9 th® object off your attentions must be th~ tost®~ing of all the miff@rent parti®s which will in~witably b~ form.®d in th~ eJourt. Its i~t@rnal di~s~n~ion~ will rend®r it unab1~ to lend it~®lf to th® vi~w~ th~t ~Yb~ ~ugg®~t®d to it by oth®r oou:x:tso Th~ influ~n@® ot th® moment will ~e usetu.l i1a1 giving a tavo~abl~ t~ to th® atfai~s of · Polandg and in changing th® ton~ @f th@ ~ou~t of at. Peter~burg toward~ th® B®public9 the influen@® of th~~ fut~® must b@ar upon th@ m~ans of preventing 
_B,us~ia from taking part in a war again~t m® or my alli~~, and from thwar~ing my views -in case of an election in Poland •••• 
Despite Br~teuil's instructions, Russian troops remained 
in PolandJ and Catherine consolidated her rule in Russia. The 
czarina soon embarked on-an ambitious Polish policyo Catherine 
also began to listen to the suggestions of •other courts• feared 
by Louis xv. Relations betw®@n Frederick II, king at .the •other 
2touis XV to ~on de Breteuil, August, 1762; in Broglie, The KingQs ~ecrer~. 9 Vol. II, pp. 23-24 • 
.3 ; Ibid., p. 30. 
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court•, and Catherine improved but did not 1mm.ed1ately result 
1n a treaty. 
Catherine's plans for Poland were based upon a suggestion 
tor a 11no~.thern ~ystemt1 of alliances formulated by N1kata. Panin, 
the czarina's foreign affairs strategist. Panin envisioned a 
' Russian-dominated alliance system joining Pru.ssia, Sweden, 
Ditnmark·, Sa.:Eony, Britain and Poland. This new system would 
• l 
oppose the •southern system• of alliances which linked Austria, 
France and Spain. An integral part of Panin I s plan was in-
creased Russian infl~enoe in Poland and Courland. 4 
Catherine dispatched Count Herman Charles Keyserling as 
her ambassador to Poland in December, 1762~ t· The ambassador's 
1nst~et1ons specified that the czarina favored the replacement 
ot Charles of Saxony as Duke of aourland with a candidate more 
sympathetic to Russia's interests. Catherine also instructed 
her ambassador to uphold the rights of the Dissident Orthodox -
subjects of Poland. Further, Keyserling was instructed to 
as~ertain the views of Polish nobles regarding their dhoice 
for king after Augustus III 9 s death.5 I 
,, 
The last part of Keyserling•s instructions was unnecessary 
for Catherine had decided as early as August, .17,62 that her 
'ehoice for king of Poland was her old lever, Stanislas Pon1a-
4 
. . 
. Herbert H. Kaplan, The First Partition of Poland (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), pp. 12-13. 
Sibid. 
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towsk1. Her alternate choice was Prince Adam. Czartor1sk1.6 
Reyserl1ng 1s arrival in Warsaw r~ised the hopes of the 
Czartoryski family. The family, whose relations with the 
Suon minister, C~unt :sriihl, had further deteriorated at the 
1762 Diet, immediately proposed the formation of a confeder-
.,_ 
ation of Polish nobles to take the field to oppose Saxon rule. 
The Czartoryski requested Russian support bu.t Catherine did 
riot want to be an instrument of a CzaJ:~toryski~led movement 
which might re:r·orm and strengthen Poland. Russia's best 1n-
terests were met by a weak republic and for this·reason Cath-
erine did not support the Czartory~ki plan.? ~ 
The ·Polish succession question soon brought the •other 
court•, Prussia, into Catherine's lite. Both Russia and Prus-
~· s1a had objectives in Poland. Bussia 0s traditional concern 
for Poland's Dissident Orthodox minority and the republic's 
geographis importance were augmented by certain p~oblems r 
. 
. -
~-------
-- ~------·--
faced by Catherine. The czarina was 1n the debt of numerous 
,..: :·!_ ··._ Russian nobles who had supported her recent royal coup. ManJ 
, -- .. -
of these nobles werer_.-plagued by ser:rs running away to Poland. . ( 
--···· -Catherine sought increased influence in Poland as a means of , 
ending the r,ef'uge which the repu~11c. provid.ed tor runaway 
serfs. Indeed$) Poniatoitski Os firs't action,- (when elected_ king 
6 Ibido See al~o I'Cnud Bahb~k ~@hmidt~ ~Probl®ms Co~ected with the J1ast Polish Royal Election.i. _ A Study in the Development of CoUI1t P~in°s Northern System•, Scando-Slavioa, t. 2 (1956), PP• 13S=<lJ6o · P·· 
" 
7Reddaway, Cambridge H1storJ of Poland, p. 44. 
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of Poland, was to conclude a treaty with Catherine which pro-
vided tor the return of Russian serfso8 More importantly, how-
ever, Catherine needed land to reward her noble supporters. 
She reasoned that this land, perhaps, could be found 1ri Po-
'-
land.9 
Prussia, too, had an interest in Poland.· Like Buss1a, 
Prussia was concerned about the fate of the Polish Dissidents. 
· In add1 ti.on, Frederick the Great, who had little u_se for the 
republic and 1ts leaders, saw a possibility- for Prussian ex-
pansion at Poland 9 s expenseo 10 
The Polish designs of both Prussia arid Russia dictated 
·-
tha t their interests in th·e next royal election would coin-
cide. Both Prussia and Russia sought a weak king for Poland, 
a monarch who would not follow an 1ndepandent course but who 
would be receptive to their policies. Frederick recognized 
I 
·• I 
that his nation's interest in the next election coincided with 
• 
Russia's and the Prussian monarch wrote to Oatherin.e ·shortly 
atter the beginning of Augustus III' s last illness. Pred-
erick0s 176:, letter madeseveralvpo1ntsc First, Prussia 
would oppose any Hapsburg seeking the Polish crown. Second, 
-··-·--
-· -- __ -_-- __ -_--·-·--·-~-·~-~~--~~--Frederi.ck p_re_ferred a Pi_ast, that is a native Pole, to any 
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8schmidt, Scando-SiaviCa, p. --144. 
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91b1d.'.); -- (' 
I • 
10Ib1d., pi). 144-147. Also, G. P. Gooch, Frederick the 
Greato The Ruler, the Writer, the Man (New York: Knopf,1947), 
pp. )21~)22~ · AU.bsrt ~or~lg ,Th® _Eastern @;gestion in the _,ight- ·-
eenth C®ntu.r:y: g The Pa~ti tion of Poland and. the Trea~y of ..
Kainardj1 ·· (New Yorks Reprinted by Howard Fertig, 1969), · pp •. 
·18-19. . . . · 
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-foreign-born candidate for the throne. Third, Frederick de- · 
clared himself ready to accept any candidate proposed by 
Catherine. Finally, he proposed a ~enewal·of the Russo-Prus-t // -·- l,.< siari· alliance of Peter !II. 11 Frederick II attempted a majo¥ 
·feat with these overtures. The end of the Seven Years' War 
would leave Prussia without allies. Frederick mistrusted his 
wartime British ally, while -his past relations with Austria 
precluded a Hapsburg alliance. Furthermore, the Prussian 
i) 
L monarch ha4 no faith in an alliance with greatly weakened 
France~ Frederick, therefore, looked to St. Petersburg. His 
.proposal of alliance, if accepted, would gain him the support 
of a state which he greatly feared as an enemy. At the same 
' 
time, the allianc® would protect Prussian interests 1n Poland. 12 
.. C~therine repl1ed favorably to Frede~iok's proposals. She 
.. asked, however, that Frederick oppose any French-supported can-
didate as well as an Austrian candidate. Catherine also asked 
'I; that Frederick oppose the movement of Saxon forces into Poland 
·arter Augustus III's death. Frederick readily agreed to Ca-
. therine • s r®cruests and ~gain proposed an ei1 ia.nc e. 1.3 By Ap-
ril 5, 1763, Catherine and Frederick had reached an accord on 
the Polish succession; but before the treaty cou1d be concluded 
__ bet_w_een_ ___ th_e_ ___ two--,rule~s~:---th-e--dea~h-,---so-:--·lon-g--exp-e-ct-ea:---or all tne 
11Herbert Ho Kaplan 9 ~aTh@ El~ction of the Last Ifirig of . Poland 9 Stani~las Augu~tu~ Poniatowski", Polish ·Review, Vol. 2, No~ 1, (Wint®rg 1957)~ pp )i=J1o 
12Kap1an, Firti!'l. Partition·, P• 20. 
13 Ibid., P• 21 • 
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chancellor1,es of Europe, occurred. Augustus III. at last ex-
pired on Octobef 5, 1763 and was shortly followed 1n death by v 
. 
•• his minister, Bru.hl.. · 
.....J 
The excitement at Augustus• death only postponed the con-
clusion of the Russo-Prussian treaty. On.April 11, 1764, Prus-
sia and Russia, Poland's greatest enemies, joined in an alliance •. 
. . :, ~ 
·-·''l. The Treaty of St. Petersburg, as announced in Europe, was com-
posed of defensive provisions guaranteeing the posses-sions ·of~ 
the two signatories •. In addition, the treaty carried several 
important secret articles relating to Poland0 The two s1·gna-
,., . ' 
tor1es agreed to maintain Poland's electoral system and the 
. 
11beru.m veto. Russia and Prussia agreed to defend Dissident 
rights in the republic and the ambassadors of both oourts were 
to work together at Warsaw toward this and other goals. Finally, 
the treaty specified that Russia and Prussia would support Stan-...,,,. 
-
1slas Poniatowski for election to the throne of Poland. 14 
The Treaty of St. Petersburg thus pledged Russia and Prus-
sia to maintaining the constitution which had so long kept Po-. 
land weak. . BGth s.&tes also agreed to SUl)port a candidate who 
~?i\ 
,-· ' 
~ .. :\··-:..t' 
was strongly tied to Russia. Stanislas Poniatowski was a mem-
ber of the pror:oRussian Czartoryski family-and h1~ personal re-
. lationship with Cathe:r:ine bound him closely to Russia~ --~More- . · ~. 
-
---.. ·---··-~------ ---
-----------~-------·----- - ---·-----··------··-··--·-·---------·-··-· - . -----··-- --
--- - ·- --·-·- ---- -~-- -- -----------
----------·-over,·-:· Poniatowski was a rather weak individual-e He did not 
14 · 
. ·- .. 
__ MolY&t5J. IDL~tor.y of European Diplomacy, p. 271; also Kaplan, Polish Review, pp. 43-44. . ~ 
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possess personal characteristics which could provide the 
, . 
leadership necessary- to reform Poland and expel-Russian and 
Prussian influences. 15 
'\. 
Russia and Prussia had pooled their strength o~er a 
period of two years to support a candidate for the Polish crown 
· favorable to their interests. France, unfortunately, had not 
been as active in- strengthening her position in Poland during 
the same period. 
The Treaty of Paris of 1763, which was, from the French 
standpoint. •neither good nor g10rious•16 freed the nation , , .. 
frqm a costly war. After the peace, however, France did not 
~.-._ turn her attentions to Poland. The Foreign Ministry under the 
~ l>u.c de Pra~lin was.dominated by the forceful Due de Choiseul, 
.. Minister of War and Marine. Choiseul, who had .. been fore~gn 
minster until 1761, believed that ·=hostilities would soon be 
" 
re-opened against Britain._ He directed the government•~ en-
ergies to the rev1 tal1zat1on- of the army, th·e reconstruction 
of the navy and the maintenance of the "southern systei' of' 
,; 
l5~owat 9 History of European Di~lomaci0 Po 2?1o On Pon1atow~ki 0 s oh~ract®r~ ~®e ~aul Ko Padower {~do) 9 00 The '· 
· First Partition of Pol2nds S®l®ct®d Docum~nt~g aharacter Sket~h of ~taniSJJla~ £ugustu~ Poniatoi'\Y'~ki 00 ~ ~l~:wonic and East Euro:e(e)an B.<~f~ie~r$) Volo 14 {~p~il 9 _ 19)6) $) PPo 082c::,684o The Comte de Brogli® also ©omm~nt®d on Poniatow~ki 0 s p~rsonal weakness. 
• i 
~-- .· · ~-- · ------·-se~·;··' Bi5ogli@-~ -Th® !!ing Os ~@©r~t S) Volo I g pp o ___ g~Q-~-?~1--~-- --------~-----------:-• - ~ • •• • 
-·------~-----------··-·· ·--- . 
----·- . 
I 
_________________ , ____ .:.. ___________________ -··-·--···»--·-·----·-- ·--. ------·-·--· - . . .. , ---· ·- l 
a:-------:---~-,,. 16JLoui~ XV to Comte de i~o@;l:1.<e 9 176); in Boutaric, Cor-~ r~spondance secrete, Vol. I, p. 112. 
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,.· ..... 
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Understandably Choiseul • s ~tt~ntions ,~o defens·e and a fu-
ture conflict with Britain meant that French interests in·Eas-
tern Eu.rope continued to be neglected by the nat.ion•s official 
diplomacy, Nothing makes this clearer than a memorandum pre-
pared by Praslin 1n 1763. 
·-,,~""21· 
This me~orandum was prepared as a result of·Cather1ne II's 
dispatch of a.n extraordinary ambassa~or to Versailles early in 
1763. The ambassador, Prince lb1tr11 A. Golitsyn, carried a 
proposal that France and Russia act jointly in the next Polish 
,, 
election. At the same time, Catherine was deep in negotiations 
C with Frederick II ~n the Polish question. Choiseul, probably 
,-correctly, regarded this diplomatic advance as a move to com-
promise France, to exact from Versailles an admission of impo-
. tency in Polish affairs. Thus, the duke ordered the Russian 
proposal rejected and Praslin produced a memorandum for the 
guidance of French policy in the next Polish election. 18 '!'his 
memorandum oft1c1ally ended Cho1seul • s concern for Poland w1 th·. . - .. ~ .r,., I --· 
... 
. the argument that France remain aloof from the next election. 
- .. '- •':!.'!''-= . 
Praslin a~ttempted to justify his case for non=intervention bY: ·. 
point.ing out that the jealousies of Poland's strongest neighbors,-
Prussia£) B.ussias, Austria and the Ottoman Empire, ·would prevent 
any of th@se ~tat®S :from gaining control or tne -re:pu.0110~19- · 
i 
1 
'lcobbano Hii~rtorz of Modern France, pp. 93-95; Gooch, Louis XV 9 PPo 180c=:)191., 
18Brogl1e, The Kin~•s Secret, Vol. II, p. 65. 
19°Memorandum on the Interest that ,·France has, in the Election of the King- of Poland0 annotated by the Comte de· Broglie, May 8, 176J; in ibid., pp.· .65-76. · 
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-The King's Seoret, however, was very much concerned with 
! 
Poland's if.ate. Unfortunately, the· Secret correspondence had . 
I 
serious prob1ems. Broglie's recall from Poland and Terc1er•s 
dismissal from the Foreign Ministry made the correspondence 1n-
-
creasingly difficult. The exile of the Comte de Broglie to his 
country estates in 1762 struck the Secret a second blowo Bro-· 
gl1e~s exile was part of the court politics connected with his 
', 
brother's military defeat in Germany. The Marshal de B?-ogl1e 
and his brother went into exile together. Unfortunately, the 
. ~ r 
count 0 s exile complicated the Secret correspondence.- This exile 
\ - -
put Broglie, the Secret•s most important policy maker, further 
,,, 
out of touch with foreign affairs. The time delay in relaying 
events to the count 6 s remote estates. in upper Normandy and re-
ceiving a reply, made the Secret almost useless. In addition, 
Broglie's attentions were turned toward secret activities in 
Britain after the Peace of Paris. These activities involved 
plans for an invasion of England. 20 Nevertheless, Broglie and 
Tercier did not entirely neglect Poland as Augustus III neared 
the end of his life. 
Broglie's interest in Poland caused him to view France's 
decline in influence there with dismay. Reports of Augustus• 
---------· 
___ ---·----.. -···· 
20E!"ogli-~. di~patched 1h®valieJ? ·d 0 Eon to Brit&in to inves• - -- -tigate that country 0 s ~ta~ of d.ef~ns~o Chewalier d 0Eon was.a 
transve~tit~o Hi~ activi i®s in Britain caused Louis XV no 
I 
' small concern,and ~mbarrassmen~ ,and con~squantly caused con-
cern to Broglieo For infox,natidn on this ~t~ange per~on 9 see Brogli® 9 Th~ King 0 s ~~cret 9 ·voio IIg PPo 7'8=182 9 as l([®ll as 
Edna I\Ji:Kons, Bo al ~ · · the ~trange Case of the Chevalier d O Eon 
· ( Londong H®inemam 9 19 : and John Bu.ch.an Telfer 9 The ~tra.nge · Career o:f the Che1ralier d 0Eon de .Beaumont. l\7inister Pleni oca 
"' t·ent1·ar from France to Great Britain in 1 Londons Long-
mans Green .& ·Company, 1 5 • 
.. 
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declining heal th prompted the count to propose again that 
France support the House· of Saxony and work through that dyn-
asty to strengthen Poland. Broglie advocated Louis XV's sup-
1 port of a saxon prince in the upcoming election. 
~. 
Broglie fa-
I 
.,,,..._.,,. 
vored Prince Xavier of Saxony, Augustus III's second son and 
the brother of the Dauphiness. Xavier was singled out because 
his elder brother, Frederick Christian, the elector and Augus-
; . ' 
tus• successor, was a sickly invalid, The king's reply to 
,. 
Broglie's suggestion of XS.vier as a candidate hardly met the 
-, 
~ count•s expectations. Louis wrote: 
· That which I chiefly d@sire for the .next Poland 
el®ction 1~ liberty ot choice :for the Poles; after 
that 9 on~ ot th® brother~ of the Dauphiness, the 
Prince Xavier for prefsrenceooooif they ~ake the 
Prince of cronti I shall not oppos~ ito21 
.!. 
Therefore, the king advocated freedom of election but would 
I• 
not oppose the election of the Dauphines.s• favorite brother, 
·Xavier, or the Prince of Conti. French foreign policy councils 
~ 
were quite divided on the Polish succession. The course that 
the nation would follo~ecess1tated a choice between the po-
0 
lioies of Broglie-and Choiseul. France could successfully pur-
sue only one ot two courses. 
The nation could attempt to take an active role 1:n the 
e;iection, revive the French party in Poland and work for 
-- ---·-- ~--- . -·---~..~~ .. ----··---~------~- -· ----------------· --- -- ------- ···------- ... ·------· .. ·------- -- ---···---- - . - --·- -·- . ---· . . ·------···-----~ -------··----·--·-----~ ---- ·-·----·------ -----····· ------··--------------·--·--·---·-·- ---~--.. -- ---···-···-·--~·--·-·--------,----' 
Xavier's victory. This course, advocated by Broglie, would 
,· ' 
': .. Ii; 
'prove extremely difficult since French influence in Eastern 
: t· . 
. Europe had diminished considerably since Conti first hatched 
21 · · Louis XV to Tercier,_ V~rsailles 9 r~arch 17, 176·3; in 
BOutaric, Correspondance secrete, Vol. II, p. 290. 
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,-
his plans for a French-supported candidacy for the throne ot 
Poland. 22 
A second- course ot action would be for Prance to remain 
~ 
neutral. 1n the eleo.tiono Neutrality would, of course• leave 
Poniatowski unopposed since Saxony did not possess the strength 
to elect Pr!nce Xavier. This lack of opposition might have 
-, 
left Poniatowski less in Russia 0 s debt and thus with more in-
dependence. Further, the new king would have no 111 will to-. 
ward France if Louis XV did not oppose his election. French 
neutrality might, therefore, facilitate closer relations be-
tween France and the republic at a later -date, 23 This plan 
was the choice of Cho1seul and Praslin. The Foreign Ministry's 
,· plan took greater cognizance of the realities of the Polish ·s1-
-· tuat1on1 Russia and Prussia were almost in complete control. 
These then were the choices open to France. It is ·Char-
acteristic of Louis XV's direction ot his government that no 
real choice was ever made •. The king was indecisive and never_ 
es~ablished a definite policy toward the election. France's 
-official and1lµnofficia.l diplomacies each worked totrard their 
respective ends and, in so do.1ng, were mutually defeating. The 
confusion of France's diplomacy 1n Poland's election is a study 
~~~_oglie, Th® Kin~ 0 ~ S~©:r®t11 V'oJ.:. ~l:I-,,-pp. _ _19 ~197. · 
-----------'------
I i 
h 
. ~·:, !):~, -
23 com t e de Brogli~ to T@rcier, Nov. 4, 1763, in Ibid., 
P• 1980 Also 9 Philipp@ ~BJ.gnSJJlg La fin de 1 1 anc1en regime et 
· la revolution am,rioain®il 1763c,1'f89 9 Volo XII of Louis Hal-phen and Philippe Sa-gnac ( edso) Peuples et· Civilisations · (Parisi Presse-s Univers1ta1res de France, 1952) pp. 261-262 •. 
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in frustration. ~ 
A, . . . (. . 
. .. 
The pre-electoral diplomatic maneuvering had already 
begun when Stanislas Poniatowski approacbed the King's Se-
cret agent in tfarsaw, Mo H@nnin, in August, 1763.. As secre-
tary·· of the French embassy, :a:ennin supervised ~renoh af:f'airs 
·.t 
. · 24. . 
while the ambassador, PaulmJ, was in Dresden. Augustus III 
was still alive when Poniatowski made an important proposal to 
·::, 
Henn1n. ~e requested Hennin to relay the following suggestions 
. '•,,, 
to. the French .Foreign M·1n1stry1 
In case of an election, if the votes were divided, 
and if the la~ge~ number were in favor of the can~ 
didate whom th® Czartoryski family ~hould put for-
ward (Pomiatow~ki] 0 ~1th th~ ~upp@rt of E~~sia 9 
would His ~oat ~hri~tia.n m~j®~ty o~d®r his ambas-
sador-so to act 9 thet at th® la~t moment ·the French 
party 9 ~upp@~ed to b® th® weake~t 9 ~houl~ join ours 
to turt~ ~)th.~ scal®f o o o o It b@ing ti®ll und~r~too©l that, . in a cont~~, case~ we should pledge ourselves to do 
· the ~am®23hing for the candidate whom France should aupporto 
-In addition, Poniatowski pledged that if France agreed to 
-t 
' 
his sug~estions, he would work to'bnite Poland to France for 
the advantage of the two nations and the peace of Europe.•26 
' The acknowJ..edged Russian candidate extend.®d.::·,an offer of al-
~· ~~ /s::-
11ance in the election as well as closer ties with France. The 
scheme proposed by Poniatowski coincided with the Foreign Mini-
'\,, 
.,.. 
. 1 
' l 
I 
i 
I 
I 
•• '.I 
;, 
stry O ~ hopes for the _ult~m~te ___ outoom.e __ of t.h_e ____ .Polish __ el.e.c.ti-on-.- ----------~--------·------~--- --~-------·--------~---·--····---
-
-
24oza.nam and Antoine, Correspondan~e secr~te 9 PPo 220=221. 
25 Hennin to Tercier 9 Warsaw, September 20, 1763, in Bro-
glie, The Kinf§ 0 ~ SJ~@r@t,si Vol. II, Pe 201. 
26Kaplan, First Partition, P• 19 • 
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·However, the ministry was __ not given the oppo~tun1ty to replJ 
to Poniatowski. 
Bennin did not relq Pon1atowsk1 1s proposals ;o the Po-
reign Ministry. Rather, he oonvey®~ the proposals to Terci~r 
by way of the Secret Correspondence. Teroier presented thes 
.::_.,,.. ,' 
proposals to Louis XV·o Louis displayed his usual 1nab111 ty to 
reach a decision. If he accepted Pon1atowsk1 1 s suggestions, 
Louis had to completel:, abandon the candidacy of Xa.vier. 27 As 
a result of Lou1s 0 indecision, Terc1er 0 s instructions to Bennin 
recommended no ac·t1on in regard to the offer •. Tereier advised 
Rennin to continue to cultivate Pon1atowsk1 1s friendship. 
•', 
·~ 
Hennin was also directed not to reveal the nature of negotia-
tions to the French Foreign Ministry. 28 
The .. Frenoh position in Poland was complicated by the 
-death of.Augustus III. With the king dead and an election ap-
proaching, Pon1atowsk1 1 s situation demanded a definite French 
. reply to his proposal of an alliance. 29 This answer was not 
immediately forthcoming. 
·, l . 
The king's indecision coupled with the intricate construe-
... 
tion of the Secret Correspondence which involved letters ex-
Q~anged betwe@n Broglie in Normandy 9 Teroier and Louis .XV in 
27Broglie, The King's Secret, V'o1. II, p. 201. 
28Teroier to Hennin, ·· October 25, 1763, in ibid.; p. 204. 
29Ka.plan,-ptrst Partition, P• 27 • 
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add1 tional re$son for the delay in a Prench reply, · might be . 
./ 
found in the ~act that the Secret was still committed to 
' 
Xavier's ocandidacy •. The Secret 0s instructions gave no au-
thority :for a comm.1 tment to Poniatowski. Even if they had .. · 
authD~ized a pact with the Polish prince, these instructions "\ 
were too late. By May. 1764, Russian troops were in Warsaw to 
force the electton of the czarina's candidate. )O 
The Foreign Ministr7, ignoryn-t of Poniatowsk1's proposals, 
dispatched a secret envoy to Poland in November, 1763. The 
ministry had 11 ttle faith in ambassador Paulmy-31 and perhaps 
' this justified sending a seoret agent to Poland. Also, the 
ministry may have believed Paulmy personally favored the 
House of Sa:x:on7 in the next election.32 In any event, ·'General 
~ Monet, a former tutor to a Czartoryski noble, was sent to Po-
land with instructions to negotiate with the Czartoryski on·_ 
the election question and to reach some sort of pre-election 
agreementoJJ Monet apparently was ignorant of the overtures 
made by Poniatowski.J4 In any event, his mission failed to 
" jOOzanam. and A.ntoine 9 Qorres:,eondance secretest PPo 220-221. 
)1 
. Tercier to ~omt~ d~ Brogli~ 9 Septo 19, 1762 9 in Broglie, The K1pg 0 ~ ~®or~t.g Volo II S) p O J)o T~jc>Cier reported he had re-quested P~ulmy 0 ~ recall from ~arsaw on the ground~ of incompe-
_(.~ ', j'· 
tenc~o IiG is r@port®d that Loui~ U 1~~plied.s CJtfuat would you _____ --------~---~ have'f:----""1\le-i:ther----1---no1~ Pr~$fl-1n-thirh'lc lUUCn~-oT-"nfm-~ but-- as--he- is good for nothing~ if we take him away from Poland, what are we to do with h1m7 00 
32 
- · Broglie, The King's. Secret, Vol. II, p. 20.5. 
))Kaplan, First Parti tio~, p. 27. 
J4ozanam and Antoine, CorresEondanee seer~te, pp. 220-221. 
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produce any. pos·1t1ve result and the Foreign Ministry's belated 
overtures to the camp of the:; Russian candidate were useless. 3.5 
· . While France ra1~1ed to gain influence with the Russian. can- --- -
\ 
.· '~ 
didate which might prove valuable after the election, the nation•s· 
----~-----~-
···-~ 
, alternative course of action 1n Poland collapsed. The candidacy 
of Xavier was abandoned. Exhausted .by the Seven Years• War, 
France could not unilaterally have secured Xavier's election. 
However, a coalition of Austria, Saxony, __ France and the Ottoman 
Empire might have opposed Poniatowsk1.36 For a time such a 
coalition was a possibility. However, a number of factors 
ended the oha.nees for intervention in Poland. 
Austria's Foreign Minister, Count Kauniz, supported Xa-
vier's candidacy,37 but Kaunitz oould not act without French 
' l -"\ 
support. His nation. oould not.afford to fight a war with Prus-
~ 
sia andRuss1a, alone,38 and Kaunitz, like Broglie, sought sup~ 
port fro~ Louis X.V for Xavier. Louis, as usual, experienced 
great difficulty in deciding what to do about Kaunitzf·request · 
for aid. He rec~ized the weakness of France after the Seven 
Years• war. His reply to Austria, therefore, was hardly enthu-
\ si~stic. The 1renoh monarch asked that Austria use its forces .; 
35:Broglie, TheI{ing0 s Secret 9 Volo II 9 PPo 210-211.:-
1:..a--~-~~---- --- - 3o -------- ---- --- --- -- - ---
7 Ibido 9 PPo 21.5=2160 ilso~ Saul Ko Pa.dover,. 09.Prince 
Kauni tz and the First P'a.,rti tion of Poland en Slavonic and East 
Europ.ea.nB.®vietig Volo 13 9 (January~··1935), p. J84. 
37Kaplan,First Partition. 9 Po )0. 
38Padover, •xaunitz and First Partition~ p. )84. 
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tor any intervention ?1n Poland. Prance would not. contribute .,,., ... ,, 
_,r-'-__,./ . • . 
any troops for a Polish adventure but Lou1s·xv ottered to pay 
chalf of the expenses of Xavier's election if his Spanish ally 
would contribute the other half•-~~. As mi-ght be ·anticipated, 
Spain declined involvement 1:tl Poland and Louis xv·• s off er came 
to. naught. 
Other -support for Xavier soon vanished. Louis XV' s vacil-
11 taon on the election question prompted the Porte to remain 
.:·· 
inactive in the situation./' · A "Memorial'' issued in Constan-
) 
tinople in March, 1764, declared the Ottoman Empire in favor 
-
of free elecft1ons in Poland as well as a P1ast king for the 
republic. 40 
Saxony~stood ready to support Xavier but the affairs of 
that state were in great- disorder. Augustus III's death in 
August, 1763, was followed by the demise of his son and elec-
toral successor, Frederick Christian, on December 17, 1763. 
Frederick Christian's son, Frederick Augustus, was too young 
to rule Saxony so the state was admini~tered by a regency com-
posed of the late elector's wife and his brother, Prince Xa-
. 41 ' 
vier. This rapid succession of rulers left Saxony _weakenetd 
' 
and unable to forward Xavier 0 s candidacy without French aid. · 
J9Loui~ XV to Tercier, Febr~ary, 1764; 1n Broglie, The 
King's S®cret 9 Volo II 9 p. 217. 
4
°Kaplan, First Partition, p. 31. 
41 Vernier, Memoires de la Soc1ete ••• de l'Aube, pp. 367-
J68.-
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a neutral policy on the election. Br1 tain had withdrawn into 
relative isolation after the Treaty o-r Paris .and was unwilling 
to take an active hand in Eastern European affairs. 42 
. '!ranoe 0 s failure to act decisively on Kauni .. tz 0 suggestion 
ot a coalition to oppose Russia ·ended·~oreign opposition to 
I y 
,;! Poniatowski. France/ had failed to establish one defin·i te Po-~ 
11sh policy and French policy was -stated by many men, all of 
differing opinions. 
. Broglie, Tercier and Rennin of the King's Secret favored 
;,;:, 
the candidacy of Prince Xavier. Through their correspondence 
and w1 thou-t the Foreign Ministry• s lmowledge, these men worked 
to re-establish the French party and the power of Great General 
Branicki. At the same time, the Secret w@akened its 11mi ted 
resources by coulfting the Russian candidate. 
The Foreign Ministry had gone on record as following a 
completely neutral policy in Poland. Yet, without the know-
ledge of Pon1atowsk1's overtures ot alliance to Hennin, the 
Foreign Ministry had opened negotiations with the Czartoryski 
j . 
by sending General Monet to Poland. /· 
· f In Poland, ambassador Paulm;y espoused the cause of the 
Saxon Prince xavier. Thi_s was a violation of the policy of 
' ~. I· 
. ···-··---. ---------- -··---Freneh. neutrality- i·n·P·aland whien -was-··th-e ··Foreign ·Mi·n·istry-•·s·--. --- ·---------
off ioial solution to the Polish question. 
In sum. 9 France''.' was represented in Poland by three dif- · 
ferent· meng Hennin, ·Monet and Paulmy. The varying policies 
42 
. 
· ·Wladyslaw Konopczynski, "England and the First Parti-
tion of -Poland", Journal of Central European Affairs,. Vol. 8 
·(April, 1948), p_. 6~7. 
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of these men made reconstruct·1on of a French party impossible. 
Their very presence and intense activity in the republic meant 
that France's neutrality was lost.. Poniatowski :"would be no 
' 
Franoophile when elected king. Opposition to his election 
- ""\. 
gerterated by the King's Secret or Paulmy only served to ~in-
crease his reliance on Russia. By following both the choices 
open to the nation, French official and unofficial foreign po-
licies were defeated. The failure of these French foreign po-
licies made Pon1atowsk1's election possible. 
As the time tor the Polish Election Diet drew near-, Rus-
sia Poured 8,000 troops into warsaw. 43 The Czartoryski, with 
' 
this Russian support,. -expelled Great General Branioki and his 
allies from the Die~ on May?, 1764. In vain, Branicki and an-
other important noble, Karol Radz1w111, attempted military re-
sistance to the Russians but their forces were soon defeated • 
Branieki fled to Hurigary and Radziwill sought refuge in Constan-
tinople. 44 Then, without serious domestic or foreign opposition,· 
Stanislas Poniatowski was elected kin.g of Poland on September 6, 
1764. 
Poniatowski reigned as King Stani-slas Augustus. His 
election caused France to break off relations with the repu- · 
-- blio and l®ft Louis XV' irwith no 1ntlu_enQe in .. __ :P_Ql~d~- ___ Poniatowsst: 
-----'-=-----
.,,. 
.. 
4J ' 
Kaplan, 
44 
Ibid., 
.:.!: .... _ :-~ . 
First Partition, p. 36. 
pp. )5-41. 
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tailed " to heal the break with France · &nd d1-~ ,. nothing to etf ec t 
a .reform of Poland's system of government. Without French sup-
45 
, . port, the way was paved for a partition of Poland, by Prus--:-----
sia, Russia and Austria in 1772.46 No longer could France 
maintain Poland. 
45sorel, The Ea.stern Question, PP• 19-22." 
46tTuss1a and Russi~ 0s involvement in the partition 
was expeot·edo For Austria 0 s role in the~2part1t1on, see 
Saul Ko Padover 9 ro:pr1nce Kaunitz and the First Partition 
of Poland~ 9 Slavonic_ and Ea.st Euro:ee~n ~ev~®l!, 9 Volo 13, (January~ 19331 PPo 38~~3980 Alsog edo by same author, 
•frince Kaunitz 0 Resume of his Eastern Policy, 1763-1771• 
Journal of Modern History, yol. V (1933) pp. 352 .. 365. 
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BJ 1764, France had suffered a major diplomatic defeat 
\ in Poland. In reviewing the years 1752-1764, severaJ. facts. - -- -------------
become clear and explain . the Fren9h defeat. Of greatest im-
portance in the French defeat in Poland was the f&ct that 
France had no unified policy in the republic. The King's 
Secret carried on one Polis~_policy while the foreign mini-
stry advanced its ewn diplomacy in the republic. ])µ,ring th,~ 
years 1752-1764, no French toreign minister learned the full 
extent of the Secret•s activities. 
The collapse of French influence 1n~Poland may be viewed 
as having occurred in three distinct phases. Each phase was 
\..'--,_ 
marked by this dichotomy of French policy as/well as by other 
salient :facts. 
The first phase of the French failure in Poland occurred 
during the years 17$2-1756. The Comte de Broglie represented· 
both the secret and official po11_cies of France in Poland. 
Both of these policies utterly failed to recognize that 
---France•-s---best- inter-e·st would -bef -served--by -a:··strotjg-_:P~J-_~!!4 .. ~----"'---
----------- - ---------- ----·- ------- ------- ----
-~-------·-
--s-1nce---,--ranc e · 1ac k ed the m111 tary strength to maintain ahe in- - · 
dependenc~ of her o1d ally, the only means of 1n~ur1ng Polish 
freedom was to strengthen the republic. The secret and off1-
oial policies of France were, however, united in the effect 
81 
< .-~, 
.,"'-·""' 
. -· l< (, 
l 
~~: 
'· (," 
r 
_. · ..... ___ .. ., .. "---· ...... , ... , ....... ---..... L.:~~~-----t _ -.£ ,~ § 
·- -·•·· ----··----- .---· ~------- ------·----- . - . ------------·---·-······· ··-- -. ·'lo, 
. ' 
_. ------·-·. -----· 
· - . - _ 82 __,____.· - _ 
.. ----··--·----------·- -- - _____________ :_________ - - -;··-..;;-----
- . 
. -1 ......... 
. . 
they had on Poland. Both policies_ further disrupted ~th_e al-
~-
. 
ready chaotic political scene in the republic •. Grodno, the . 
' 
. -
. 
. 
----- ----------·-
---- .. -~~~~~==,-=-=~=--estrog'·"·atf·atr an.a.· tlther··' problems ·a.1sltur~a ···po1·1·sh po11t·1cs ----------------~------ --~'1 
. 
·'-"-:" 
and forced-the Czartoryski family closer to Russia. Only 
on the eve of the Seven Years• War did Broglie realize t~at 
........ 
a strengthened Polan.d would ~e useful to France. He had at--
tained official but not· ··secret supp.art for a plan to stx-eng-
then Poland when the D1plomat1c Revolution occurred. 
,, 
The Diplomatic Revolution of 1756 opened the second phase 
-of the French debacle in Poland. The Diplomatic Revolution 
tied Fra:nce to a Russian alliance which forced the nation to. 
,.,....,.. 
remain officially silent during several Russian incursions 
into .Poland during the Sev;n Years' War. Russian ~ti vi ties 
in Poland forced the Secret into a more extreme ant1~Russ1an 
stance and the dichotomy of France 0s Polish policy continued. 
Russia's exit from the Seven Years• war in 1762 opened 
the third and final phase of the French defeat. The fact that 
Prance was still involved ~in the hostilities while Russia was 
a non-combatan~ shifted the initiative in Eastern Europe to 
Russian hands. The Russian preeminence in Eastern Europe was 
- I 
.j 
enhanced by the French Foreign M~nistry(s retreat f.~om active ________________________ _ 
-~ - ,- . -- -particip!3-~ion _ ~~ __ j>oli sh_ affairs. ____ .The __ For_eign----M-1n1-s-t-:i--y--i!aeeci-----------'--'--'----~-
defeat 1~ the Seven Years~ ____ war_,by .. sh.ift-ing-i-ts---emphas-is --to-~--- · 
' . 
the rivalry with Britain$ The Secret, greatly weakensi by a 
number of factors, tried to oppose ·Russia's candidate to the 
Polish throne but failed to block the election of ·Poniatowski. 
·~ 
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By 1764, 11.ttle was left of French influence in Poland 
' I 
and Eastern Europe. The nation• s Russian alliance was gone. 
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Indeed, Russia reacted to past French interventions in Eas-
) 
tern Europe ___ by :founding a ~northern system00 of alliances • 
. •-. 
This northe·rn sys.tem sough·t '.to bring together Britain, Denmark, 
Poland,Prussia and Saxony with Russia in an alliance group 
directly opposed to the •southern system•. 
tem linked France to Austria and.Spain. 
This southern sys-
( 
French influence in Poland was, of course, non-existent 
by the end of 1764. However, its defeat in the republid in-
f-lu.enoed France's relations with other states as well • 
The Diplomatic Revolution and events in Poland dealt 
FranooeaTurkishrelations a serious blow. The Fren~h defensive .-
. -.". 
agreement with Austria, the Treaty of Versailles, required 
each nation to support the other in ease of attach. While 
Ve~sailles regarded the alliance as a weapon against Britain, 
., 
the Porte realized that any attack it launched on Austria. might· 
bring· its old French ally to the support.of the Hapsburgs.1 
The Treaty of Versailles 9 new French ties with B.uss:ta and···the 
desultory performance of French policy in Poland markedly coo.led 
;' 
~,/ 
---- .. ----··--·-- .... ' ·----·-·------ .... t .. he Porte~s ardor.for France's fr1end~h1p. France lost much of 
;: 
-~ 
. ,_ ~----- . . " ('" . . 
11--------·· \ rts remai-n_i-ng---p.r-es-ti .. g.e----in---C-on-s-tanti-nopl-e----.. -by.-enc.-our.ag!n-g-tne---G-t--------· 
' 
" 
toman Empire to deelare war on Russia in 1768. 
1 . The ostens1 ble cause of the Russo-Turkish War was a raid . 
1Mowat, History of European Diplomacy, pp. 2)5-2J7. 
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by Russian troop~ into Turkey in pursuit ot Po11sh rebels. In 
reali't,y, the Ottoman declaration ot war was France's last ett'ort 
_________ ---------------~- __ -c==-~--------t-o save Polande An Ottoman--vi.ctory would Jnave stopped the· ad-- -- --·---
vance of Russian power into Europe. Unfortunately, the Ottoman 
-.p1re went down to defeat~ Prance was able only to give the 
-----------~- -~~~-- - Port-e limited military aid during the wa~. Moreover, French 
' 
·41p1om.acy was unable to temper the humiliating mreaty of Ku-
..• 
·chuk Ka1narj1 which ended the hos_tilities. These events cost 
• , I_ 
France_most of its influence in Constant1nopleo 2 
. ' t,; ···. ' \ 
France's relations with. one other European state were at-
.,, . , . j, r·. 
feoted by the k1ngdom 0 s defeat in Poland. Count Kaun1tz, the 
pilot of Austria:• s foreign policy, came to distrust France as 
. an ally. J French per:formanoe in the Polish election as well 
,,I 
~sin the Seven Years' War-were no doubt the cause of Kaunitz• 
-distrust •. , French relations with Austria certainly did not im- _ 
prove as a result of Kaun1tz 1 interception of much of the 
King's Secret eorrespondence. Kaunitz was able to crack the 
2 
:Oo B~ F101";)nS) Gr®at Br1 tain and Euro:2~ i.n th® Eight~enth 
Cent1:11r:( (Oxfords Clarendon Pre~~S) 19ffi-$) Po )61o iUSo 9 Leo 
Gersh.oyg ~om x»es12.oti~m to R~volution ~Neif Yorks Harp®r & Bow, 
1944)g Po 1150 Th® Tr~aty of Kuchuk K&inarji gav® Russia the 
right -to mair.rtain ~hip~ on the Bla@k Sea aS5 'tqell a.s to bring 
these vessels through the B0$3porous. and X))e,ridl.Bl.nalles o Und~r 
' I 
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-------------------------- ------------ -- the .... treaiy S)· . Russi?& g~ .. :ln®d t®~rito~y whi@h ----s~cured ~eP hold- en------~------------·----------~------·-.:. 
the north~rn sho~~ @f . the Bla~k Sea and opened the way for - -- - ~_., 
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Jpadover,"Ifaunitz and theF:J.rst.Partition•, p. 384. 
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-cypher· 1.n which the correspondence wa.-s written and ·discover 
• I 4 that there were two French foreign. po11o1es, not oneo This 
_________ !~~--~~~ly a ~-~~~~t;ion, to 1n~p1re confidence in an ally •. -- --- __ ------~-- -- - --- -- - ------- - ----- ·--- ·-
--'-··-··-··-- .. -·- ·. -----------
The French diplomatic defeat in Poland, then, affeoted __ -
not only Louis· XV's relations 'tfith the republic. French re-• 
lations with other states w~re also adversely affected in ·-
what amounted to an even greater loss for France than just 
Poland's independence. 
This thesis examined French policy in Poland. Such an 
examination is pertinent to the study of the eighteenth cen-
tury because French blunders in Poland were symptomatic or 
. the· ancien r,gtme's conduct of its foreign relations. The 
defeat in Poland and its aftermath, added to the losses of 
the Seven Years• War, combined to surround the regime with an 
aura of defeat. 
ment at home. 
This air of defeat discredited the govern-
If many Frenchmen had little faith in the 
government by 1789, foreign relations~ defeats such as Poland 
contributed to this sentiment. 
4 
.' - James. Thompson and. .. Saul Ko Padover, A Record of EsJionage and Double-dealine;, Jarrolds, 193?.,-PP• 153-156. 
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APPENDIX 
In April, 1773, the Comte de Broglie submitted to Louis XV a memorand'UJD. •on.· the_ Pres_e:n.t Po~it.1.on .or _.France --in- the Poli t1cal- _::::~_::::__ ---· ~~===-,~,~=" --~---.CC-..-----"~-cc= - - System --cit- Europe ~--o -~;mi. -. ~ticie IV of .. this memorandmm1 i~ @RAti tled 
. ·: ... 
~ :: ' . ; 
'·' .. ; ~J. \ 
-. 
- •on Poland~ ar.~d summariz®~ ~ogli® 0 s vi®~ of W~en©h policy in Polando Brogli~ wrote this m®morandum sft®r ~h® first par~ition of Poland ~11d did thus witness the final resu1t of ftanc@ 0s Po-lish deteat1 Mr translation of the important parts of Article IV follows. 
On Poland 
It is not at all necessary to recount here the origin ot 
,, 
our alliances with this kingdom.u Properly speaking, France 
had no' ties with the republic before our commitment as a guar-
antor and mediator of the Treaty of Oliva ot 1660. However, 
France was often involved in the affairs of Poland but never 
w1 th the resources which she. ought to have used.· 
The first wise _and rational plan for a system in regard 
to this republic was that which was begun in 1752. We suc-
ceeded in gi vinp some stability to the patriotic part7 (_the. 
French party] (n the Diet of that year and in the Di~ti!il of 
1754, 1756 and 1758. We proposed manj times to make the party 
useful by making it i~portant in the alliance between Prance, 
the court of Vienna and Russia. 
This alliance was adopted without ~ull appreciation ot 
I 
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from protecting Poland. - -
The danger was that Russia would take the pretext of the 
war against the king of Prussia to force a passage for its 
1 . . ' 
. ' ' ~ From Poli ti . U® d~ tou~ l®~ cabinet1S de l O Euro ·e en-" .. - - .. 
' . 
. dant les re~es qe Louis XV et ~de ~ouis XV~ Hamburgs Pierre .. Fr.ancois · Pauche, 1794), pp. 262-270. ·. ) 
. 
( 
\ .. 
- I 
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D 
"'··· 
troops through Poland and to exa~t provisions and even·w1n-..... ~--,c-
ter quarters trom that state. In allowing them once again 
----~--~-~------------------ to, use these despotic' means' we gave up this vast land to the 
'j 
greediness of the Russian generals, to the despotism of their 
court, and to al1 the future projects of usurpation which they r1 
would be tempted to torm because of the ease of oarrjing out 
·, all sorts of vex~tions on a divide~, isolated and abandoned 
nation. r· 
These troubles were all the more vexatious to P.ranoe 
since by permitting them she allowed a blow to be struck· at 
~er credibility, her motives and her preeminence. 
This mistake on her part seemed all the more inexcusable 
·since France ·was allied, against·· her 1nteres1;,w1th the court 
of V1enna and through 1 t w1 th- Russia against the king of Prus-
. sia. 
Prance should have been the senior pa~tner 1n this al-
liance, because the other powers need®d her; she should have· 
. been abl.e to preside over it,. to direct it and to be the arbi-
trator. · However, she let nerself be drawn into such rash mea-
. 
I .. ~ . • !'. ,, 
I', . 
; • .,...,."J 
~----·--· ------
sures that -it could have been said, to see this course, that 
! ' 
·· --------~~!° gJ:'~'31,1,?_1~$$ oiher hea-lthdepentied· on. this· Batlle a.lll8Jlc8; ·:=--;_:;:>:~-~-! I -----=_ .-·-•c .. 
-- Tfte rapiddl!Uline whioh. then fQ!loiJed-f01' US WaS diffi- . c~ ........ ..... 1 
• 
cult to arrest; but it would have been pos·sible1 to moderate 
.. . 1 ts rate, to at least preserve the d·ign1 ty and · super1or1 ty (' 
·' which· we had· not yet all.owed to be lost. 
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_ - Under· this poor alliance system the objects of our allies 
. 
. 
_________________________ -----.----~-----· _____ were fulfilled while $he i~portant object for us was -sacrificed.- ----------- --------· 
That 1s to say we 1o·st our preponderance and .our right of pro-
-
-, ,. I 
( :1 
teotion and mediation -in the north2 as well· as in the, Em.pi.re. 
Aa already noted this first right was acquired by the Treaty 
of Oliva. The right to intervene 1n the Empire was won at the 
Peach of Westphal:·ia. . 
Prance should have required that the demands made on Po-
land by her allies, the two empresses, be f 1rst submitted. tbr 
approval to the government.at V®rsailles; next these demands 
·~.,~ ' 
should have been subm1-tted to the king and the government of 
/) 
the Republic of Poland for approval by a senatus consult12m . 
or an extraordinary session of the Diet ••• eThis plan was pro-
posed but 1 t was not adopted •••• The Polish nation came to se• 
France as no more ~than a tool of' Vienna and s:t. Petersburg. ,r" 
• 
L-·- Poland was divided into different parties, one of which gave 
- . 
j . 
Jt'.' . 
·-· , ......... 
I -
.. · .... ,' 
·T ., . 
. itself.over to Russia, others of which involved themselves in 
sedi tio~s cabals _ and domestic warfare. France no longer counted 
tor anything and the entire north followed Po1'apd Os example. 
There is the origin of our discredit, our inab111t1 to act 
----·- ..•. , ......... ··•" ···-··-·"·--··-· -·---·- -~"··· .. _ .. _ .. ----·-··---·--·------- -····· - -· .... . 
-1n the el®ct1on of Count Poniatows-k1 and of -the failure of T- -- - ----- --- -- - --- -- ----- -, ... - ..... -----~----- ·-·-••<·------·--. 
--···-----------~--"--·--
-.all that tJ® attempted or favored. 
2Th® original memorandum us~s this tel'lll,, 1e- norde Le nord ~ as cc;,mmonly used in eighteenth century Frenc'F1 diplomatic corres-pondence referred to north oent:f!:al and northern Europe, the Bal-tic are, -1.e., Sweden Poland 0:C>u.+la.nd, etc. 
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It would be useless and disagreeable· to recall here that I . 
· which followed and culminated in the treaty of partition •••• 
\.' All there is to add is that: there is no longer a re-
. . 
public; the state is dismembered. The king remains as long as 
~ 
y· he pleases God or the three parti t1on1ng powers; things have 
... r. 
.. 
/ 
------~"-~-- -~-. - _, ,_, __ _; ___ -- - ' -
. ~. : 
. . 
.•. 
come to the point that if 1 t was more convenient tor the powers 
to expel the king, in order to furthe~~- partition the remains,. 
· Prance as well as the rest of Europe would be unable to pre-
vent them. The efforts o,r the Turks did not· succeed -and -in 
order to~save some remains from their debacle they agreed to 
henceforth keep out of Po1ish affairs •••• 
The pos1 tion of Poland in regard to France and a11 the 
~ther powers of Europe is thus one of a member out off from 
' society, of a citizen deprived of his natural rights, reduced 
to slavery, civilly dead and consequently no longer having ••• · 
property or personality. Such is the :fate, in the pol.i t1ca1 
order-, of. a formerly illustrious nation, a state which P,ro- _ 
claimed the son of its king czar in Moscow,J received the 
homage of Prussia in Warsaw and saved a proud but hum~liated 
. . ~ Auatria. in .f..~oxxt ·or th.(@ i-rrall~ or V.·i®m1.~a 
3Sig1smon.d II c,f !>Oland an<il. Sw@den was proclaimed czar 
in 16z6~ · Tnis·---was ·au.ring a Poilsh invasI-on ot Russ·1a:·-au.r1ng _____ _ 
that state's -Time of Troubles. 
,' .. ~ .... 
4 . . 
Reference is to Jan Sob1esk1 1s lifting of the siege of 
Vienna in 168.). 
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.VITA 
Julius Ralph Ruff was born on August 28, 1946, in 
Staten Island, New York. He is the son of Julius Linoo1n 
l:lutf and Ruth Wilbu.r But'f. Arter attending the elementary 
. .. 
-:1 I 
•-,.:., 
( . 
schools of the Cl ty of New Yorl,t_, Julius Buff graduated f'rom 
''·\: .. 
Brooklyn Technical High School in Jtme, 1964. He attended 
Guilford College in ·Greensboro, North Carolina where he re-
ceived the A. B• degree in his:tory in June, 1968. As an 
undergraduate, Ruff was a Charles Ae Dana Scholar and was 
awarded departmental honors in history upon graduation. 
From September, ·1968 through June, 1970, Julius Rut:f 
served as a graduate te~ch1ng assistant in.the D1partment 
o-£ History at Lehigh University. 
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